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A STUDY OF GERI^N-ALERIGAIJ RiiLATIOlIS PRIOR TO 1914.
I.
BASIS OF THiil "TRADITIONAL FRIiJ^TDSHIP^'
.
!• Frederick the ^reat and the American Kevolution,
The initial relations o±" the United States with the King-
dom of -Prussia found their motive generally in self- interest,
though behind the official attitude of the Prussian government
there existed a ssrmpathetic regard for the new republic.
Philosophers and poets - Kant, Lessing, Goethe, Schiller,
Zlopstok - with a message of liberalism, marked with satis-
faction the attempt of a new nation to emancipate itself from
the sovereignty of a Monarch. Jj'urther, not all of the princes
of U-erman States were capable of bartering the peace of tiieir
subjects for British gold, and some were perhaps aniiiiated by
sentiments or cordial interest for America. For G-eneral
:Yashington the Prussisxi Zing conceived considerable respect.
The conduct of the siege of Boston he approved, and he "wrote
to his brother, Heniy, to watch Washington's movements against
Howe and Burgoyne. In the two daily newspapers
1. This is the substance of the case which llr, i^ancroft makes
on Prussia's aid to America during the period of the
Revol;ition. See History of the United States, v. 10 chs
.
2,3. The enthusiasm with \¥hich Lir . Bancroft wrote on this
subject is criticised by Doniol, Histoire de la Participa-
tion de la France a 1' iiJstablissement des ^tats-Unis d'Ameri-
que, V. 3 p. 117.
2. The story that he sent to ./ashington a sv/ord engraved
"From the oldest to the greatest General" is unfounded. See
Sparks: .Washington V.ll, p. 169.
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printed in Berlin in that day thore appeared a strong note
of sympathy for tho suooess of tiio Amorican causo. But the
good wishes of dreamers baid of tliose (ierraan princes who pre-
ferred to Jceep their military forces at homo were not of any
concrete value.
The attitude of the King of -russia toward the revolting
colonies was friendship of a negative sort - hatred for Britain.
Frederick nold tnat Lord Bute had not carried out tne ororaise
of subsidies made hy V/illiam Pitt, and had made Prussian
interests suhservient to British polioy. Thon Frederick: waa
not indifferent to the maritiPQ possibilities of ilast i^rus-
sia. iilmden wus made a free port in 17bl, and the Asiatic
and later the Bengal trading companies were estahlishodf To
such projects as these the British fleet was a menace. Until
the outbreak of the war of the Bavarian Succession (January
1778), I'rederick was cynically content to watch th^ progress
01 tho war, and occassionally to fan tho flamos. Ho did
not foresee any greatness for the new State, whoso unlimited
extent he considered an insuperable obstacle to a republican
g-ovemment, viiich might exist only in Sijch small states as
Switzerland and Holland. The promise v/nich ho saw in
Ajnerica v/as a source oi* intermittent rebellion against the
3. Zapp: Frederick the 'vireat and the United States, quoted
in Proceedings, Peiinsylvania -Jerman Society 1904. Paper
of October 2b. 1904, p. 11.
4. Bancroft: History of the constitution v.l p. 71.
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motijer country.
On October 1, 1776, iiilas Deano, at Paris, urgod upon
tlio Congress tne advisability of sending an agent to the
Oourt at ±>erlin, v/hioli was ru;iiored to be susceptible to of-
5
fers of trade. A month later tiie King of Prussia made knovaa
his desire for to Araorican at liorlin, suggesting a conunsrciGl
arrangement. In furtherance of this project, Llr. ueane,
during November, sent Llr. OarJiiichaol on wliat proved to be a
fruitless mission. The follovang ji'ebruary conies of the de-
claration of independence were placed before tne Prussian
King, with a request for friendship and commercial intercourse.
The reply was noncommittal, and in Aoril 1777, Llr. Arthur Lee
was sent to .berlin. A:nerioan diplomacy was getting into ac-
tion, ana events wore moving too rapidly, lilr. Lee was scarce-
ly persona grata. It was contrary to i'roderick' s y/ish that
he came, and he was pennitted to remain only in an unofficial
capacity. On June 26, liaron de !Schulent)urg declined to open
/russian ports to iuaerican privateers, urging tl-jat tne King
"cannot embroil himself with the court of London," but
offering- the hope tneut 'che attitude of j?'rance and Spain on
the question might change views of the King'^
b. uTaarton: Diplomatic Correspondence of the American Revo-
lution V.2 p. 156.
6. ibid. V.2, p. ZbO.

On tills same day Lee's correspondenco v/as stolen from
his rooms "by an agent of the iiiglish minister. Frodorick,
thinking it inexpedient to give ringland a rebuff, took no
steps to punisli tne offender, or to secure tlio minister's re-
call. To his brother, Henry, ho wrote: "Shan't fail, however,
to write to England about it.... for the y are iiaportlnent
Again he wrote: "I purpose to draw out this negotiation in
order to fall in with the side for v/liioh Fortune shall declare
Q
herself." LIr. Lee withdrew in August, hut negotiations were
not broken off, for on October 8, Schulonburg infoirned iir.
Lee that "we must wait for more favorable circujiistances to
begin a co;ranercial connection between the tv/o people, vhich
his majesty v-.ill receive great pleasure in seeing increase,
whenever it will not engage him in measures contrary to his
9principles.
"
On January 3, 1778, the VTar of the Bavarian Succession
Gorainenced, tending to throw Frederick on British Mercy, and
delaying any further commercial projects. Peace was finally
made at Teschin on Llay 1^> , 1VV9. i^iarly in that year Prussian
ports were opened to iimorican merchant vessels, and by June
V/illiam Lae seriously considered applying to the Eing to ful-
7. Wharton: Diplomatic. Correspondence, v. 2, pp. 55 1-4
8. Avory: A History of the United States and its People,
V.D p. 141.
9. 'Jharton: Diplomatic Correspondence v. 2 p. 407,
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fill his promise "that he v/ould ackno v^i edge the independenco
of trie United states :,s soon as jj'r^jice had done so-''^*^ During
the surajQor these hopes were iuid to rest, for ij'rederick was
tOO astute to allow his promise to work to the disadvantage
of his kingdom. His minister replied that '.^russiaji interests
were not maritime ani that the king was unwillin^j to direct
any influence in tMs direction, recognition "by PriBsia would
be not nearly so efficacious as the support of Spain and J*'rance,
and would malce war "between iingland and Prussia inevitable v/ith-
out rendering the smallest service to your country."^"'' However,
Prussi:;ji ports were open to the American trade.
After this time i-'russia, with the other Baltic powers,
became involved in the league of neutrality, which put an end
to questions of recognition and aid. But when American in-
dependence was practically an accomplished fact, advances were
again made. In September 1782, Ivlr. Uarmichael wrote from St.
Ildefonso that the ministers of Saxony and i?russia were disposed
to urge upon their courts the advisability of opening trade
relations v/ith America. '^ iilarly in 1784 negotiations were
opened for a treaty of commerce, which was concluded September
10, 1785.
It remains to state that i?'rederick had freqient oppor-
tunities to permit the violation of Prussian neutral! 1^ by
allowing ijerman meroinaries to be tr^-^n sported through his
10. iVharton: Diplomatic uorres-oondence , v. S, p. xiSO
11. ibid. V. 3, p. 547.
12. ibid. V. b, p. 785.
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JCingdom. These he oonsistontly refused, in conlormity to iiia
middle-of-the-road policy. Frederick spolco harshly of the
Gorraan princes v/ho sold their forces to England. But the fact
tiiat they had refused to make a similar transaction with him
was at least partly tm cause oi his indignation. Some muni-
tions were purchased in i^ussia during the earlier part o± the
war - in at least ono case with more advantage to the contract-
or than the purchaser, for the goods proved wortnless, and the
Prussian Government declined to use its oxficers to rectify
the matter.
"^"^
During the revolution "Hessians", with troops from Bruns-
wick, Anspach, Baya?euth, Anhalt, and W'aldeok, to the total
number oi over tMrty thousand, wore sent to A/aerica by the
British Grov/n. This lias always appeared to the American
people as rather a blight upon tiie King viio sent them and the
princes who onus oartered tneir subjects than upontho soldiers
themselves, wno came most unwillingly in the main.
lo
2. The Treaty of Amity and Commerce of 178o.
There are two principles kno\m to international law
respecting private property on the high seas. The oldor rule,
comin^^ down irora the Gonsolu-to del Ivlare, declared that goods
Of an enemy were subject to capture even though found on a
friendly vessel, while an enemy vessel carrying a cargo be-
longing to a neutral was also subject to capture, though the
15. Wharton: Diplomatic Correspondence v. 2 pp. 21 5, 446.
14. Avery, v. 6, p. 142.
lu. Treaties and Conventions (1776-1875) p. 707 et seq.
-6-

Foods were released. The newer doctrine is ombodiod in the
saying: "Preo ships, free goods; enemy ships, onemy goods",
implyin^T that the flag under wJiioh it is carried detonainos
the character ox the cargo. The newer rule was first written
in a treaty in lobO, and was adopted by the United States in
16
its earliest treaties. The treaties of 1778 and IBOO v^ifch
Prance, •^'^ of 1782 wL th the Netherlands,-^^ and of 1783 mth
Sv/edon, all provided for the newer doctrine of maritime
capture. This view was also put ior\.vard by i^'redericlc II in
the i3ilesian Loan Case of 1V52, but did not meet with the
20
agreement of the British Commission vaiiich tried the case.
The Armed neutrality of 1780 v/ent fartnor than this prin-
ciple, and endeavored to inalce the rule merely: "Free sliips,
free goods", without the converse: "iiinemy ships maice enemy
goods". And v/hen hostilities ceased in 1V8S it was the ac-
cepted view of the principal continental powers. Daring the
wars follov/ing the Prench Revo Imfc ion they hastened to retire
21from the new principle.
So it is not peculiar tliat in the treaty ox amity and
commerce negotiated with Prussia in 178b it was provided tlmt
^
16. Lawrence: Principles of International Law, 4th ed.p.659.
17. Treaties and Conventions (177d-1873) pp.249 ,2bl. 270.
18. ibid. pp. bll,614.
19. ibid. pp. 801, 80S
20. Ivlartftns: Causes Odleboes, II p. 97, (iu.oted in Snow: Gases
on International Law, p. 244.
21. Lawrence, p. o6(Z-

free sidps raado Ifroe £;oods, with no man "Lion as to the oharaotor
oi' neutral conimorce loaded on an oneniy vessel. Did tho con-
verse regarding cargoes of enoiay siiips follov/ irom inference?
In tne case ox tno "Noreide" U;;iiof Justice Marsxiall held timt
22
it did not." Thus the treaty of 1705 (and tho treaty of
1V95 with Spain, which malces the saiao provisions) are right-
fully regarded as significant steps toward tne recognition of
a more liheral and just altitude toward private property at
sea in time of 'jyar.
In still another respect the treaty of 178& is remarkable.
In generc^l, the law of ntttious icnov/s only one penalty for
carrying contraband of war: confiscation ox the goods, if not
the Ships also. But Article 13 of tho treaty provides that
not oven arms, araniunition, and other military stores may "be
confiscated. I'emporary sequestration is permitted, wtth reason-
able compensation for timo consumod; and such stores may be
reciUisitioned in part or in wholo, with parent to tne owners
at the price current at tne destination; while if the master
of a vessel cnooses uo deliver the military goods on board he
shall De allowed to proceed freely.
2^. Scott: Cases, p. 884.
2S .Article 13,i'reaty oi 1785. "And in the same case oi one ot
the contracting parties ooing engaged m war with aiky otner
Power, to prevent all the difficulties ana misunderstandings
that usually arise respecting tlio merchandize heretofore
called contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military
s-cores ox every icind, no such articles carried in the ves-
sels, or by the subjects or citizens oi one of the parties
to the enemies oi the other, snail De deemed contraband , so
as to induce confiscation or condemnation i^nd a loss oi
property to individuals. Hevertneless, it snail be lawful
to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for
sijch length of time as the captors may tnink necessary to
-8-

This uroaty expired in Ootober, ivyo, by virtuo oi its
own provisions; but Article 12, containing tiio "Free Ships,
iroo goods'' rule, was revived by the treaty oi 182B.
The iaot -hiiSLi i/nree Aworicans so distin^aisned as jramtlin,
Jeiierson, and Jonn Adains signed this notable treaty was fre-
quently referred to with pleasure by diplomats oi botn coun-
tries.
'6» i'he Treaxy oi Amity and oomraerce oi l'/y9.
It has been romariced above that while the continental
powers came by 1783 to agree v/ith the League of Arroed I^eutral-
ity -uhat tno newer and more liberal rule tov/ard maritime cap-
ture saou.ld L»e recOe,nized
,
tney hasuoned to revoke their con-
sent wnen uostilities again oroJce out. I'hus tne treaty of
1V99 recites tnat since the nev/ ruJ.G uas not ooen sufiio iently
prevent the inconvenience or dama^^e oijat might ensue from
tneir proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation
for tne loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors.
And it shiill further be allowed to use in xhe service oi
tne capuors tno Wi^ole or any part of the military scores
so detained, paying the owners the xull value oi tiio same,
to be ascertained by the current price at 'Uhe place of its
destination. But in the case supposed, of a vessel stopped
for articles uex'eooiore aeemed contraoand, if tne master of
tne vessel shopped 7/ill deliver out the goods supposed to
toe of contraband nature, he sua. 11 be admitted to do it,
and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any
port, nor lurther detained, out Suall be allowed to proceed
on uer voyage."
24. Treaties c;nd canvontions (lYVo-lfaVS) p. 71b et seq. V/liarton
!lllements of International Law, p. bl2, et seq. gives de-
tails o-L tiie negotiations.
9

raspoctod in the wars since iVBi), wnonever line oassiioioii o±
iiostilitios peimitB, iho two nations sixall oomo to an agree-
ment, either between tne iselves or jointly with other powers,
to arrive at "such arrangements and such permanent principles
as may servo Co oonsoiiaaLe tiiO iioorty and the safety of the
neutral navigation and commerce in future wars". (Article 12)
And in the meant i)no, if either contracting party should
become a 'beliigerant v/here the othar was neutral, the belliger-
ent v/as bound to "conduct themselves towards the merchant
vossois o± tne neutral power as favorably as tiie course of the
war then existing may permit, observing the principles and
rules of the law of nations generally acknowledged." {Article
12)
Article 13 contains the same provision as tiie treaty of
1785 to the effect that arms, ammunition, and other military
stores Shall only bo temporarily sequestrated or requisitioned
v;ith eciiitable remuneration, but adds moreover a clause ta the
effect tioat "all cannons, mortars, fire-arms, pistois, bombs,"
etc. in excess of the requirements ox the vessel, passengers,
and crew, shall De deemed articles of contraband.
This treaty expired by virtue of its om provisions on
June iic;, IBIO.
4. The Treaty of Ooramorce and Navigation of 18H8.
Probably no commercial treaty to v/hich the United states
has been a part has been the grounds of more serious discus-
sion than the Treaty with I'russia of 1828. In theory this
-10-

treaty was in force when tho United Statos declurod war on the
Gernian iitooire in 1917.
The twelfth article of tho treaty ot 178b, providing that
free Siiips made free goods, was revived, as v/ere certain articles
from the I'reaty of 1799, Moreover, inasmuch as the intention
asserted in the latter ( to the end of securing an agreement, among
tro maritime powers of Europe on the treatment of private prop-
erty on high seas) had never heen carried into effect, it was
reasserted as the intent of the contracting parties. Tho
article on contraband in the treaty of 1799 was aoaong the pro-
visions revived.
Important q^uestions under this treaty arose from time to
time, and wi l1 "be treated in later chapters.
25. There were attempts made at various times to carry this into
effect: in 1823 LIr. John 'iuincy Adams invited the European
Powers to discuss the treatment of Private property on the
high seas, hut the powers declined} President Pierce nx-^^ed
such a declartLtaon in 1866; the American delegates at the First
Hague Conference were instructed to propose the questiDn for
discussion, hut it was tabled; the Second Hague Conference in
1907 approved the tlieory, but did not put it into practice.
See Lawrence, p. 494, et seq..
26.For a very unusual supplement to Article 25 of the treaty of
1799 revived by the treaty of 1828, suggested by tho Gorman
Foreign Office after diplomatic relations had been severed
in 1^17, see Scott, I'reaties iietwoen tne United otates and
liermany p. 202 et seq., and Gerard, Idy j^'our Tears in Germany,
p. 578, et seq.
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II.
RELATIONS PKIOR TO THj] PALL OF BIS^JIRGK.
1
1. Jiinigration from (ior/aan to America.
From the foundation in 1682 Of the first permanent German
settlement in America, on dovm through the ninetoenth oentuiy,
German omigr.. tion was prampted by a desire for peace. This fact
is noteworthy, for if in later years German-Americans showed
indifference to the great military acc omplisknent s of the father-
land, it was largely "because their very presence in America was
a protest for peace. .Dunkers
,
Amish, Moravians, O.uakers, Men-
onites, and otlier sects sou^t peace in liie exercise of their
religious convictions. Peasants vho had heen pauperized by tlie
taxes in the principalities sought peace from the oppression of
the petty princes, warmers distressed by tte failure of their
meager crops sooght a livelihood in a country abounding in clBap
farmland. Later, v/orkmen sought relief from the hardships at-
tendant upon the industrial revolution in Germany by emigrating
to the land where there was work for all. Liberal thinliers
in the age of Metternich saw in America the realization of the
political ideals which v/ere cjaathema in Germany. And
finally, the long series of wars, from the T-hirty Years Y/var
down tliroagh the time ox Napoleon and even tte years from
1864 to 1871, and the weighty military duties resulting there-
from made thousaiids of German subj ects emigrate to the land
of peace and freedom. Almost five thousand jGrman mercenary
so;Ldiers preferred the people they had been fighting to their
l.jj'aust, The German ^..ement in the United States, gives a compre-
hensive treatment of tte subject of German Jimigration to America

native state, and reiaainod m Ajnorica alter tiie Kavolutionary
2
Jar. Of the total imaigration to the United states during
the nineteenth century - over nineteen million souls - five mil-
5
lion, or more than one quarter, oano from GerniEiny.
An inspection of the following table snjwina; tne number
of Immigrants from Germany after 1820, when records were first
kept, brings out certain points for consideration. Llany factors
contribute to tho result, but it appears that war, financial
depression, and lood snortage, as well as social reform and more
inviting opportunities of settlement have had considerable bearing
5
Immigrants Conditions in
Year Conditions in America from Uerm;
1820 v/estward expansion 968
1821 383
1822 148
1823 183
1824 230
182fa 450
1826 511
182? 4b2
1828 1851
(iermany
Unrest throughout
German states; op-
pression of ±>urschGn'
schaft
Obstruction to com-
merce betv/een states
Keligious turmoil.
Burschen to be pun-
islied on suspicion.
2. Rosengarten: American History from G-erm^-Ji Archives, p. 45
3. i?*aust, V, 1 pp. 581-2
4.Report of U.S. Immigration Commission, 1911, v. 1 pp 66-96
5. Faust, V. 1 p. 582 et seq. analyses these figures. The Annual Reg-
ister gives contemporary material.
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Year
1829
1830
1831
1832
18S5
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844
1845
1846
1847
1848
1849
Conditions in Amorioa
Advent of Jacksonian
democracy
Land si^eculation;
town "buildini^';
cheap land; need
t' labor
General prosperity
Financial panic
Railroads opening
the '.Vest
vVestern states
offer indiLicements
to settlers
Irainigrants
from Germany
597
1976
2413
10194^
6988
17686
8311
20707
23740
11683
21028
29704
15291
20370
14441^
20731
34355
57561
74281
58465
60235
Conditions in
Germany
Reflection ol revolu
tion in i^'rance; riots
ovor introduction of
machinery and redac-
tion in hand-labor;
ovorpo puliation; over
crowding in farm dis
tricts
Suppression oa. upris
ings.
Oholora aoidoraic
Reaction and heavy
taxation
Failure in potato
crop.
Rebellion, followed
by reaction; f Light
of many liberc^ls.
a. Period of 15 months.
b. Period of 9 months.
-14-

Iniiiiiip.'un 1/0 Condition a in
Year Conditions in Amorioa from Jor.iany uorriiany
18U) 78896
18bl 72482 i'ailuro of vintage.
1852 145918
1853 141946
1854 215009
1855 71918
1856 71028
1857 Financial panic 91781
1858 45310
1859 41784
1860 54491
1861 Civil War 31661
1862 27529
1863 33162
1864 57276 War v/ith Denmark.
1865 iiind of war 83424
1866 115892 War v/ith Austria.
1867 133426
1868 55831^
1869 131042
1870 118225 vVar vrith j'ranoe.
1871 82554
1872 141109
1873 i'inancial p<Anic 149671 Financial panic.
1874 87291
a. Period of 15 months
,
eriod ai 6 months.
-15-

Inraigran ta
Year Conditions in AiiDrica from Germany
Conditions in
Germany
1675 47769
1876 319S7
1877 v/estem land attrac- 29298
tive; clieap grain ex- Grain imiDorts
1878 ported. 29313 irom America v/ork
hardship on farm-
1879 34602 ing classes.
1860 84638
1881 210485
1882 250630
1883 194786
1884 179676 Germ-cn S.v/. and S.13.
Africa aoquired.
1885 124443 Bismarck's social
legislation.
1886 B440b
1887 106860
1888 109717
1889 99538
1890 92427
1891 113554 Poor crops
1892 119168
1893 ij-inancial panic 78756
1894 53989 Development of
German colonies.
1895 32173
1896 31885
1097 22533 Poor Crops.
1898 War with 6pain IV111
-lb-
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Year Condition in Am ;rioa
Ijiiaisruntt;
from Germany Condition in UGrriiany
1899 Slavic ard Ital-
ian immigrants
1900 mrk for low wagos
1901
1902
1903
1904
1905
1906
1907 jj'inancial panic
1908
1909
1910
17476
18507
21651
28304
40086
46380
40574
37564
37807
32309
25540
31285
Agricultural
depression.
Dec Lino of oirtci
rate
2. Grerraan-Amoricans
.
Carl Schurz once remarked tiuit a German looiced much more
manly in America tlian in Germany, ihe greater part o± the Ger-
man element, l)y industry and thrift, became sturdy citizens of
the republic. More than three-fourths would take out naturaliza-
tion papers within ten years, r/hen the public school system
developed, a good proportion of tho children ox Gorman parentage
were found in school, iiducation by the state liad been one of the
demands made by . the Liberals in Germany during the era cd:
-17-

repression, iijo^ v/liilo tho first generation in Amorica might
oling to tho native tongue, the second generation vjould inevitably
learn jilnijl.ish. lYhile repressive measures in Germany toward Poland
kept alive the native speech, the absence of compulsion in
iunorioa was happily attended "by a desire to speak the language of
the country.
It is worti]y to no i^e tnat v/hile the early Gerasn immigrants
v/ere not conspicuously in tho forefront of exploration, they
followed the first wave and made permanent settlements v;here the
pioneers liad only paused. The outhreak of "che Revolution found
trerman farms dotting the frontier froQ I^iaine to Georgia. V/ell-
cared farms and tidy enclosures marked the WDrk of the sturdy
German farmers, v/ho were able hy frugality and hard lahour to.
prosper on the soil, while more restless settlers wore out one
strip of land and then moved west to clear another. The Germans
not only helped to hold the frontier, "but gave their full smre
of support to the forces which drove out Howe and Gornwallis.
The systematic repression established by the Carlsbad
Decree, and later the reaction which follov/ed the revolts of
1848, expelled the most liberal element from Germany. vThile
some 01 the leading "forty eighters" found refuge in European
countries, the majority came to America. Dr. Francis Lieber,
who came to America in 18£7, and Carl Schurz, a "forty eignter",
may be taicen as conspicuous examples of these 'emigres, bringing
an idealism in politics which made them valuable citizens. Their
-18-
I
loyalty to the ro public, far from being divided "beoause of
foreign birth, was greater oooause of wJiat li.ioy had suffered for
their ideals,
Gorraans arriving; later in the century found that farm land
was becoming less abundant and hence more valuable, v/hile tiie
v/ava of Slavic and Italian irarnigrants, with lower standards of
living, made more than successful oompetitors in the labor market.
These later arrivals from Germany, laciiing some of the hardihood
I
of the early settlers and the vision ox the 'e^^nigres, were fre-
quently less favorably im ;ressed with America, and in the years
1908-10, \'«hen 89,132 immigrants arrived from Germany, 41,262
returned to the lathorland,
'Dhe differences and rivalries between North and South Ger-
mans, between "'russiaji and Saxon and Bavarian and the subjects
of some twenty petty states, between Oatxiolic and Lutheran - these
and other distinctions were almost insuperable obstacles to
German unification. In 1898 the Imperial Ohancellor, Prince
Hohenlohe, cor/miented in his diary on the difference between the
reaction..ry Junkerdom of Prussia and the liberalism of South
Germany, and remarked tuat the Prussian landlords still gave
their allegiance to the Kingdom rather than to the lirapire.
And if such was the spirit of particularism within Germany,
what could be expected of AiJioricans who nad left Germany before
unification was accomplished? So far, in many cases, as they
felt drawn to an^y state in Europe, it was to the kingdom or
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duohy which had boon thoir homo, rather than to the Hew iiinpiro.
They did noL forget tho wars where German was arrayed against
German, nor the struggle "between Lutheranism and Roraanisra. And
wtiilo many might recall fighting under a Gorman flag, to many
oonors a standing army v/as the bete noir from which they had
fled to avoid service. In tho face of these adverse oircirastances
enthusiasm for the new Empire ani solidarity of Gorman feeling
nover developed to the extent tiiat was believed in Germany.
It is only fair to add that many German-ilmori cans reco^izod not
a political, but an intellectual and moral allegiance to the
f.-therland. German university and home, culture, literature and
art and music, the memory oj. the wars a^^ainst Hapoloon and the
tiarnvereims perpetuating the name of Father John, all served to
bind Germans to Germany. But tne loyalty, oe it noted, was not,
in the main, political.
A few attempts were made, partly from Gerinany, to set up
German states within the United States. The misapprehension
that America was an asylum lor tue outcasts of iiurope, ccanposed
01 heterogeneous states wnich might sever the federal bonds at
will - a misconception easily acquired before the Civil 7/ar -
gave credence to such a proposal. Missouri I in 1834), ,;isconsin
{after 1836) and part^i Texas were each the object, of such
intentions. A territory colonized by Germans, and admitted to
tho Union as a German State would have a considerable influence
in Congress, and would later be in a ,-ood position to secede aid
6. Faust, V. 1 Chs. 2IY, ZY, v 2, p. 184 et seq.
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form an indeparident state ii dissatisfied with tho Union. These
un-American aouemota to direot lienntm settlers nelped to cause
tho German preponderance which still exists aboat St. Louis and
Milwaukee - a condition which affects politics at the present
time,
3, German-American Understanding,
V^ith oppressed nationalities the American people are
sympathetic almost to a fault. In particular, those wno iought
and suffered for unification and constitutional government in
Germany made a Suron^, appeal uo Ajaericans. ioid the refugees v/ho
fled to tnis country v/ere eloquent for the cause they had re-
presented. I'he German press in America did nox forget the
revolutionary forces across tiie water. ICinkel, whom Carl ochurz
had rescued irom imprisonment, called on tne country to make an
investment of two million dollars in a second Germun revolution,
V
and tor a time was popularly supxoor'ued.
In 1V89 the 1 irst American student matriculated in a German
University. In the lirst half of the nineteenth century 116
followed his example, Bancroft, Motley, Longfellow, Ticknor, aad
Edward iiivereui. among them. By tne opening of tne twentieth
century this movement had increased to immense proportions.
Beside, the presence of Germcin instructors on American faculties,
and the study of German literature, mad© anotuer bond of
sympathy - but again, tne bond was not political. Then the
7. Faust, v.2,p,185
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diplomatists from tho United States at Berlin were of a caliber
to ooiiuiiund respecc - Wiieaton, jjancroit, liayard xaylor. Dr. .Vhite,
and V/iliiara waiter PholpJas. .Vith uancrol't, and ulso v/itli Motley,
Count Bisniarok was on temis oi intimacy.
Gorman sentiment aiiring tne oivil V/ar teuded to strengthen
tne good ieelinfc,s between tne tw nations. j;ore!nost, the Ger-
mans in tne great nortlwest s "imported the Union to a man. Salo-
mon was one ox the war-governors of V/isconsin; Schurz and iSigel
were major generals; Dr. Lieber prepared the code of war lor the
Government of the Armies of the United States in the Field. In
Germany, Jj'ederal bonds soid well a.nd the iiinerican Consul General
at i- rankiort-on-the-lvlain snipped thousanas of pounas oi lint
and linen to v7ashin^;:ton, the gift of the citizens of that city.
On the other nana, in the i''ranoo -Prussian V/ar Napoleon III
was believed to nave ueen one aicgressor, and sympathy was with
the Germans. General Sheridan was well received as Ai'aerican
observer with the Prussians. Our minister, V/ashuurne, at Paris
v/as in charge of German interesus, and was aule to induce the
±rench Government to adopt an extremely generous policy toward
Germans in Paris - a service which the German Govamraent ap-
preciatea.
In tne yeurs following there were numerous evidences ox
existing xriendsuip. Ex-.r'resident and Mrs. urant were received
with marked attention wxiilo in Berlin. At the forktovm Centennial
seven descendants of Baron Steuben were guests of the United
buaoes. in 1883 tha Rhine Valley v/as inxmdat^d, and gifts amount-
ing 25,000 marks were received by the American Legation, while
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otlier donations came through other channels. Many other straws
showed a similar tendency of the current,
4. Extradition and Certain Other Treaties.
The droit d'aubaine was a relic of medieval times when the
holding of land was connected with feudal ohligation to an over-
lord, and hence where real property could not be allowed to fall
into alien hands. This queer right provided that in case the heir
to any property were not a subject of the state, the property
should revert to the state. Similar to this was the droit de
detraction, a usage which provided that a tax might be imposed
upon the removal from the State of any property acquired by
inheritance, ^itill another usage which had existed in Europe was
a tax upon emigration, with a view to securing the removal of
these obstacles, Mr, Henry »Vheaton, United ^^tates Minister at
Berlin, entered into negotiations with the various German (-Courts,
The result was a series of treaties abolishing reciprocally these
restrictions. The Hanseatic i^epublics had removed restrictions
on inherited property in 1827, in a Treaty of i^'riendship, Com-
merce, and uavigation. I^^r. wheaton signed treaties to remove some
or all of these usages with Hesse Cassel and V/urtemberg in 1844,
with Bavaria and Saxony in 1846, and with Hanover and ilassau in
1846.
In 185E Daniel V/ebster signed with the minister resident of
Prussia an ©xtradition treaty between the United .:5tates on the
one hand and the Kingdom of Prussia, and nineteen other German
-25-
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sovereignties on the other. The treaty provided that other members
of the (ierraanic Confederation might heoome parties to its provi-
two
sions "by formal accession. Within the next/ years five others
acceded to the treaty. iSimilar treaties were negotiated with
iiVurtemburg and Bavaria in 1853, with Hanover in 1855, and with
iiaden in 1857. ^ince these German iitates followed the continental
rule, whereby a state refuses to surrender its ovm citizens to
face trial in a foreign country, these treaties provided that
reciprocally the United States woiad not be considered to be under
obligation to surrender its citizens to the (German iitates.
The crimes for which a person was to be given up were murder,
assault with intent to murder, piracy, arson, robbery, forgery,
utterance of forged papers, counterfeiting and embezzlement.
In 1871 Mr. -oancroft negotiated with the ^^erman ii-rapire a
convention respecting the rights and treatment to be accorded
consular agents, and protecting trade-marks.
5. Naturalization.
The presence of so many ©erman immigrants in America early
gave rise to questions of naturalization and citizenship, especial-
ly since German citizenship carried with it compulsory military
service. Airing the war with Austria LIr. -oancroft took the op-
portunity to press the need of a naturalization treaty. His over-
tures were successful, and resulted in the Treaty of 1868. with
the Horth ^xerman Union, it provides that each party shall re-
cognize as citizens of the other all persons who, after five years
of uninterrupted residence, shall have executed naturalization
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papers. Citizenship by naturalization was declared forfeited
whenever a person returned to his native land with the intent not
to return to the country where he had he en naturalized. "The
intent not to return may be held to exist when the person natural-
ized in one country resides more than two years in the other
country." A naturalized citizen was declared liable, on return
to his original country, to be tried and punished for offences
committed before emigration, subject to the limitations estab-
lished by law. In the same year Mr. Bancroft signed naturaliza-
tion treaties with iiaden
,
Bavaria, Hesse, and Wiirtenberg, similar
to that with the Ilorth German Confederation, save that the one
with i:iaden provided for punishment of a naturalized citizen for
desertion upon his return to his original country, and did not
set any length of absence after which citizenship was held to have
been renounced.
The existence of naturalization treaties did not prevent
questions of citizenship from arising. i?'rom 1868 to 1897, 449
cases were handled by the American Minister at Berlin; of these,
326 cases were decided agreeably to the United i^tates; 316 were
cases of former C^^erman subjects vi/ho had emigrated between 16 and
22 years of age. The cases differed little save as to minor
circumstances; a trerman emigrated to America at the age of sixteen
or twenty, became naturalized, and returned for a visit to his
former home. Within a fev/ days he would be brought into court
on a charge of evading military service. After 1871 it became a
question as to whether the treaty with the x^orth lierman confedera-
tion extended to Alsace-Lorraine. The uerman JJoreign office main-
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tained the negative. J-he question was of current interest, for
Alsatians were for historical reasons more disinclined to Hiie
service than native liermans. The vxerman point of view toward
military service was entirely different from the American. An
American is privileged to go when and where he pleases. Jiut in
Uerniany military service was considered the ordinary and reason-
able service which every citizen owed to the state. One who
attempted to escape this obligation was entitled to little sym-
pathy. The minister of j^'oreign affairs, isaron von Biilow, father
of the later chancellor, once said to Dr. White, "I^tr. Minister, dont
allow cases of this kind to vex you; I had rather give the United
States two hundred doubtful cases every year than have the slight-
est ill-feeling arise between us." i^o long as this was the spirit
of the Foreign Office affairs went well.
Unfortunately this spirit did not always characterize the
German 'Government. Antipathy for German- Americans frequently
resulted in abrupt notice by the police to a naturalized American
to quit the iJimpire within a certain number of days, not as a re-
sult of any misconduct. The case of Dr. G.V/.Geist is in point.
In 1884 Dr. Geist was practising dentistry in jj'rankfort-on- the
Main. He was a naturalized -t^-merican citizen, had fought in the
Union Army, and was residing in tiermany only long enough to educate
bis children, all of whom were under military age. He was sudden-
ly given notice to leave the empire in two months, or become a
Q
German citizen.
8. J^oreign Relations, 1884, p. 196.
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The department of 6tate did not deny the right of a State to
expel undesirable characters from its territory; but it repeatedly
pointed out that comity demanded that this right be used with
moderation, and that good relations would inevitably be disturbed
9
by indiscriminate expulsion. It also declined repeatedly to ex-
9. The position of the two governments is set forth in -|2ie follow-
ing notes. Count. n.Von -bisraarck to Mr. Pendleton, U.S.Minister
,
at Berlin,
foreign Office, Berlin, December 23,1885.
The said Uickelsen
,
shortly before the attainment of the
military age, received, upon his recuest, a discharge from
Prussian nationality, and the assumption seems justified that
in making this application for discharge he was actuated solely
by the purpose of withdrawing himself from the performance of
the general military duty in Prussia.
A sufficient sojourn, one of more than two and one-half
months, having been permitted him for a visit to his relations
and for the purpose of attending to any business matters claim-
ing his attention, it appears to be requisite tn the interest
of the state to carry into execution the expulsion decreed
at the end of the period of respite expiring on January l,next.
The undersigned avails hin^self , etc.
H. von Bismarck.
Foreign Relations, 1886, p. 313.
Mr. Bayard, oecretajry of State, to I^. von Alvensleben,
German Minister at "Washington,
Department of State,
Washington, March 4, 1887.
•T* T* ^ ^
There is no disposition on the part of this Government to
question the right of the Imperial Government to expel any
foreigner who violates the laws ur the policy of the Empire or
^ose misconduct may cause his presence to be productive of
disorder.
In this respect all citizens of the United States, whetier
native or naturalized, are held to the same accountability and
stand on the same footing. But to concede that the fact of
being a naturalized citizen of the United States, with the
rights and exemptions incident to such citizenship, may,
irrespective of offence by word or deed or general course of
misconduct, be held of itself as to a certain c^ass of citizens
of the United States a sole and sufficient ground for expulsion,
would be equivalent to a deprivation of all right to sojourn
-£7-

tend its protection to persons who attempted to enjoy Ihe privi-
leges of both nations while fulfilling obligations of citizenship
in neither. -L'hus certain persons who left the United iitates to
evade the draft during the "^ivil %r, and then requested the good
offices of the American Government to prevent military service in
Germany were given no consideration whatsoever. The American
(Sovernment also maintained that the test to be applied to a
naturalized citizen abroad was not so much his length of residence,
but his intention to return or not to return; that the tv/o year
period specified in the treaty of 1868 was only "a rule of evi-
dence, establishing a pri ma facie presumption" which might be
refuted by evidence. The ijerman 'j'ovemment maintained the view
that a residence of two years woriced deprivation of acquired
citizenship ipso facto .
Further mention of the significaace of the visits of German-
Americans to the fatherland will be made later. It was regrettable
that on a liuestion so frequently recurring the two Governments
took such opposing views.
and peaceable residence in the German -c-mpire except under the
most precarious and arbitrary limitations.
The undersigned avails himself , etc.
T.S'. Bayard.
Foreign delations, 1887, p. 481.
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III.
GERIvIAN-AMERICAN COMAERCIAL KEIATIONS.
1. German Economic History.
The opinion is freuuently voiced that in advocating protection
in 1879, Bismarck was steering into unlaiovm waters; it would, as
Mr. iJawson points out, he more correct to say that he was resuming
an old course from which the i^tate had been drifting, j^'rederick II
was as crafty in finance as in war, and to build up agriculture
and commerce he had decreed that no goods which could be produced
within Prussia were to be imported, while no raw materials which
would support industry were to be exported.
Early in the nineteenth century the Prussian Government saw
that if accord in fiscal policy could not be secured and maintained
among the numerous German states, trade wou;i.d stagnate; ijiited,
the German states could protect themselves effectively. From 1817
it was the policy of Prussian diplomacy, headed by Motz, to work
toward a customs union which would embrace the several states.
For a time three such unions existed, in iiorth, wiouth and Middle
Germany. The iJorth and South Unions merged, and finally the
middle group united in 1834, By 1862 practically all the German
sovereignties had acceded to the 2ollverein. This union was pro-
longed by agreement until after the war of 1866, when the lior th
German Confederation was created. In 1867 a new Zollverein was
formed b^ treaty; the Parliament of this Union consisted of the
Horth German Diet plus deputies from the states of iSouth Germany.
In 1871 came the unification of ij-ermany.
1. An excellent discussion of the ^jconomic history of Germany
is to be found in Dawson » The German Empire.
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The trend of these events was more significant than the
formation of a u-erman ^ollverein whioh could stand as an economic
unit and protect German agriculture and industry from competition;
it was also the ground over which Austria and x'russia v/aged war lor
supremacy. In 1846 J^^ngland had adopted ?ree Trade, i'rance had
fallen into line , and negotiated a commercial treaty in that
sense with England in 1860. Agitation for a similar step was not
lacking in Germany. or years an active -U'ree Trade school had
been preaching the new economic doctrine. In 1848 the agricultural
societies petit; oned the iJ'rankfort Parliament for abolition of
duties. ''1'hile Austria was irrevocably protectionist, and Bavaria,
Wurtemberg, and other "^outh Overman States were strongly in favor
of a tariff, the shipping, part of the manufacturing, and - of
interest in later years - the agrarian interests were in favor of
Free I'rade. The question came to a focus over a proposed ^'ree
Trade treaty with ij'rance. In what seemed a hopeless tangle ijis-
marck saw an opportunity to gain two ends at a single stroke. In
1862 he made a treaty v/ith -c'rance, and made ratification by the oth-
er states a requisite to a renewal of the Zollverein, which was
about to expire. Thereby he eliminated Austria, and bowed to the
5^ee Trade wishes of certain powerful elements, including the
landed aristocracy and the bureaucrats. At the same time he
departed from a traditional policy.^
As early as 1838 Mr, ""heaton. United Estates Minister at
Berlin, had endeavored to secure a reduction by the Zollverein of
2. Dawson, v.l pp. 152-4; Fisk : Proposed Middle Eurox)ean Tarriff-
Union, p. 6.
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the tariff on tobaoco and rice, which would have benefited half our
tobacco crop and a considerable Sinount of rice. 'J-'he duty on rice
was reduced, but our tariff of 184E incited retaliation. In 1844
Mr. Wheaton made a new arrangement favoring tobacco ,rice, and lard
on a basis of reciprocal concession, but when •t'resident Tyler
referred the treaty to the Senate, that body decline to ratify it.
First, it held that such a treaty invaded the rights of the liouse
of ir^epresentatives to participate in fixing duties - curiously
enough setting a limit to its own authority in making treaties.
Other motives were the Whig hostility to downward revision in
any form, and the unpopularity of President Tyler.
The iJ'r an CO-Prussian Vifar was followed by piping times of
peace. The Jj'rench indemnity made the new government independent
and impetuous aad almost improvident in constructing public v/orks.
Money was more than abundant, bpeculation in business became the
order of the day. Agricultural property v;hen sold commanded an
4
unprecedented price. Inflation characterized all branches of
endeavor.
In the wake of speculation, over- capitalization, and over-
production came the crisis of 1&7S. A cry for help went up to
the government. But -bismarck was not an economist, iieretofore his
attention had been directed upon political rather than economic
questions. He was not a theorist, iiut as he viewed the situation,
progress had existed side by side witii protection, while the
Free Trade departure of 1865 had, after the increased production
3. Fisk: American Diplomacy, p 225.
4. Dawson; iiivolution of Modern ^erman
,
p. 236.
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made possible "by spending the J^'rench indemnity, been followed by
panic. He believed he saw a causal connection, and proposed to
5
return to a protective tariff. The Tariff of 1879 came on a
wave of protection which gained strength in practically every
country save iJritain.
Agriculture has always held a privileged position in u-errnany,
due first to its importance as the activity which nourished the
state and gave occupation to a larger number of subjects, and se-
cond to the close relation between the landed nobility and their
feudal overlords, the numerous '^erman sovereigns. liVhile even in
the second quarter of the nineteenth century tlie growth of organ-
ized industry began to presage an industrial revolution, agrarian
6. The view of the government is expressed in the speech from the
Throne of i«'ebruary 12, 1879.
"At the same time I am of the opinion that
our home industries in thfeirentirety have a claim
for as much assistance as can be granted to them
by duties and taxes, an assistance which in other
countries is given to similar industries, perhaps
in excess of the individual re quire nents.
"I think it my duty to try to reserve at
least the German home market to national production
so far as that policy is compatible with our other
interest. We shall, therefore, return to those prin-
ciples which have been jarcved by experience, which
have guided the. Zollverein during almost half a
century of prosperity, and v/hich we have, to a
large extent, deserted since 1665. I fail to see
that that departure from x'rotection has brought to
us any real advantage."
Barker: Modern Germany, 4th ed. p. 684.
-32-

interests remained predominant. In 1871, 64% of the population
of the empire was rural, against 36% of urban population which
included not only industrial workers "but also those engaged in
trade and commercial pursuits. Agriculture v/as so prosperous
that, as we have seen, it was the landed interests which, pre-
ferring Free Trade to a tariff that would indirectly tax the entire
population to support new industries, had demanded the Ji'ree Trade
policy which iiismarck instituted in 1862-65. Grain was regularly
exported to England, even when there was a scarcity in Germany,
for it would bring on the JCinglish market a higher price than the
poor among the urban population of Germany could pay.^
Since that time the area cultivated has increased slightly;
the yield per hectare has increased considerably; the number of
farm laborers .i,s greater; forced sales due to bankruptcy have
diminished steadily. Superficially it would appear that agricul-
ture has flourished. J5ut relatively agrarian interests have been
lagging far behind - relative, that is, to the growth of industry.
Of the total number of dependents on occupations, the following
table shows the percent dependent on agriculture and fishing,
on the one hand, and on manufacture, raining, and building on the
other?
Dependent: 1882 1895 1907
On Agriculture, etc . 42.5/a 36.7 28.7
On Manufacture , etc . 35.5 39.1 42.7
The percent of urban population increased as follows:^
6. Dawson: Evolution of Modem Germany, pp. 235-6
7. if/ebb: Mew -l^ictionary of Statistics, p. 440
8. Ibid. p. 481
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1871 ' /5 '80 '85 '90 '95 1900 '05
36 39 )o 41 44 47 50 54 57
German industries developed to suoh proportions that by
1880 the predominance of agriculture "began to be threatened.
The ever -increasing population had previously served to increase
emigration; after reaching a maximum in 186E, it gradually sub-
sided, as American farm land became less cheap and as the increase
in ijerman industry caused the employment of greater numbers of
workers. This made more mouths to feed, while farm hands became
less plentiful. About 1890 industry took the lead, and agrarian
interests dropped to second place in importance.
2. Rise of the Agrarian League.
The central and western agricultural districts in ijermany
were largely owned by prosperous peasant farmers, "^"^''hile is^ast
Prussian was a region of large estates owned by the Junker olass
.
The latter had never felt the pressure of keen competition, and
were unprogressive and improvident imnagers. Their social pres-
tige made it possible to borrov/ heavily on their estates, a prac-
tice in which they indulged until these estates were mortgaged, on
the average, for over half their value.
In competition with the products of these feudal estates
came the grain and meats from the Mississippi Valley and the West.
The development of transportation facilities made it possible to
feed the industrial communities of Germany more cheaply from
America than from i^ussia. As J^ismarck said, "It was the knowledge
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of American competition, with which, without protective lines, v/e
were unable to cope in our smaller and older and poorer lands, which
"«'Q
dictated ray agricultural policy in Germany. Bismarck was in
close sympathy with the agricultural section of Prussia, from
which he came.
In 1888 William II came to the throne, and two years later
the first Chancellor was succeeded hy i^eneral (afterward Count)
Gaprivi. Unlike i3ismarck, the new Chancellor had not sprung from
the landed nobility, and was derisively called "der Mann ohne
Ar und Halen" - the man without soil or grass. Gaprivi recognized
the fact that industry had eclipsed agriculture, and that the
need of the times was cheap food - cheaper than could be produced
on German soil.
At this juncture trade relations with the United states were
of considerable importance. By imperial decree of June 25,1880,
the admission of all kinds of pork except hams and sides of bacon
had been prohibited, on the ground that raw pork previously im-
ported had frequently contained trichinae, which could not easily
be detected except in ham and bacon. This ?/orked great hardship
on an important American industry, aad the -ameriean i^ovemment
was desirous of determining the facts. The Department of iigri-
culture made a careful investigation, and found nothing to sub-
stantiate the view that American pork was unheal thful. In reply
to the invitation of the President to the German Government to
9. Von Schierbrand in Century 42:156, May 1902
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send a commission of experts, came the telegram: "Government
declines to investigate or suspend order. ""^^ >-!ir cumstances made
the imperial decree appear in the light of a measure to protect
agrarian interests rather than public health."^"^ First, the meat
was eaten in America with no untoward results • Then , the imperial
Government showed no willingness to probe the allegations. i/Vhere-
ever sickness developed from eating pork it was found not to have
been of American origin. It developed that many German laborers
ate raw pork, usually of local origin, thereby increasing the dan-
ger from trichinosis. The pork from -^^ussia was notoriously of
poor quality, and yet by ordinance of March 6, 1883, the previous
decree prohibiting the importation of pork in general was abolished,
and in its stead pork of American origin was specifically excluded,
v;hile -t^ussia and other countries were permitted to resume the
trade
.
By i^ection 3 of the tariff act of October 1, 1890, the
President was authorized, in the case of countries whose export
of sugar to the ignited >^tates was admitted free and which in
10. i'oreign i^elations
,
1883, p. 355.
11. :v]r. Sargent, the u. 3.Minister at -Berlin, wrote: "The pretense
of sanitary reasons is becoming the thinnest veil and
is now apparently only insisted on as an excuse to the united
States," and went on to give evidence of duplicity. The letter
was carelessly allowed to be published, and made the recall of
Mr. oargent necessary, jj'oster: i^iplomatic Memoirs, II p. 13.
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turn imposed tariff upon -American agricultural or other products,
to enter into reciprocity agreements admitting American products
free, or to proclaim against their sugar the same tariff rate which
12
they imposed upon sugar from America. Uow the fact that in 1690
the United "^tates imported almost three billion pounds of sugar
made it highly desirable for Germany to secui-e the admission of its
13
sugar on this privileged basis. At this time, despite thorough
government inspection, America was the only nation whose pork
was prohibited in ^^ermany. At once the ij'oreign Office came forward
with a proposal to waive the sanitary restrictions on pork in re-
turn for the continued admission of sugar on the free list."'"^
The Department of "^tate properly took the view that if a sanitary
restriction could be thus removed, it was not a health, but a pro-
tectionist measure, and in this case the singling out of America
was scarcely in accord with the most- favored-nation provision of
Article v of the treaty of 1828. An agreement was finally reached
at Saratoga, i^ew lork , in the summer of 1891, whereby the lierman
Government accepted the inspection certificate of the Department
of Agriculture as to the microscopic examination of pork, and
reduced duties on other agricultural products, while the President
agreed nut to avail himself of the retaliatory powers granted in
the tariff act of 1890."^^ The United '^tates thereby gained the
12. Statutes of the u.b. 51st i^ongress, 1st Sess. 1889-90, p. 612
13. statistical Abstract of the u.^. 1904, p. 559
14. Foreign delations, 1901, p. 511.
15. General JJ'oster represented the United states in these negota-
tions, and relates his experience in Diplomatic Memoirs, II,
p. 12, et seu.
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benefits of the lower grain rates of the Caprivi reciprocity
16
treaties.
The crop failure of 1691 had driven alrr.ost all interests in
Germany to support reciprocity, and at the moment some agrarians
reversed their policy and voted for reciprocity. But sober second
thought came quicicly; the landed nobility soon saw the consequences
of such a move. The ICaiser had supported Caprivi ' s policy, and had
nade him a count as a recognition of his services. But the in-
fluences about the i^aiser were all against the J^'ree I'rade idea.
Increased trade and lower prices spoke eloquently for the change in
fiscal policy. J3ut there was at work an influence more potent
than reason.
Terrified at the trend of events, the agrarian interests
banded together in 1695 to form the Bund derLandwir te , or Agrarian
i.eague. Its political strength was swelled by the numbers of
the ixerman Peasants' League, making an organisation 200,000 strong.
Every method of propaganda known was employed to check the new
fiscal policy.-^''' The -Crussian nobility - the heart and soul
of the opposition - were loud in their bitterness against the
li.aperial Chancellor. The xiaiser was shocked, and at Sonigsberg
in 1894 he took occasion to reprove them sharply: "Forward then,
with uod's help, and shame upon him who leaves his King in the
lurch:" £5ut the junkers were not thus to be mollified. They sent
16. A good discussion by i»r. ^eorge iilsk, formerly second
secretary at the legation in Berlin, in American i^eviev/ of
Reviews, 25:327, ..larch, 1902.
17. Dawson: The ^^erman -Cimpire
, II p. 277 , et seq.
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a delegation to the Kaiser, addressing hi.; as Landesvater -
ij'ather of his i^ountry - and poisoning the name of Oaprivi.
In the fall of 1894 Uaprivi was forced to retire - a victim
of the Agrarian ..eague. He had advocated a better understanding
with nations, such as the United states, who were ^^^ermany's in-
dustrial superiors. He ah andoned Bismarck's policy of keeping close
to Russia, whose influence Gaprivi thought to he deleterious. With
his fall ^erraan-iiraerican relations suffered a hlow.
3. Results of Agrarian iSupr emacy.
The press was one of the most potent implements in the hands
of the Agrarian League. Of course puhlic opinion had comparatively
little weight in Germany. The Government could, for a time, pursue
a policy unpopular with the country. ±sut to make the nation support
the protection of agriculture at the expense of cheaper food was a
task indeed for tie agrarian press. The sums which the Agrarian
League had at its disposal and the influential position of the
Junkers made a vigorous campaign possible. Of course, reciprocity
was a fact, and would continue to be until Gaprivi treaties ex-
pired in 1903-4.
The Agrarian League had two stock arguments. One was the
necessity of making Germany economically self-contained, iiritain
might favor Jj'ree Trade, but in case of v/ar the iiritish fleet
would safeguard the food supply. If Germany were isolated, could
-29-

slie hold out? Only "by protecting agriculture would this be possi-
18
ble. There was philosophic teaching to support this view
which the Agrarians urged.
The second reason for protection was the contention that
agriculture perpetuated the sturdy stock needed in tue army. Men
from mill and factory could certainly not fight so well as men
who had led an out-of-door life, -i-'his argument passed unchallen-
ged for want of evidence to the contrary until 1895, when the Ba-
varian Government classified its recruits. 'I'he population of
Bavaria was about evenly divided between agriculture and industry;
but of the accepted recruits 26.4% came from agricultural pur-
suits, against 28. 4^0 from industries.
A corollary of this propaganda for protection was opposition
to nations whose interests ran counter to agrarian interests.
In this category the united states easily took first place. The
most-favor ed-nation clause of the treaty of 1828, and the re-
ciprocity agreement of 1891 were objects of attack. Of course,
the free admission of sugar had been advantageous; but the
concissions favoring Americaii agriculture were naturally disadvan-
tageous. But the press did not stop here; it proceeded to
carry out a policy of blackmail seldom e^:ualed among peaceful
18. Count Caprivi did not overlook this strong argument, in the
Reichstag, -Uecember 10, 1891, he said: "The existence of
the S^ate is at stake when it is not in a position to depend
on itg own sources of supply.... It is my unshakable convic-
tion that in a future war the feeding of the army and the
country may play an absolutely decisive nart." Dawson:
Involution of Modern Germany, p. 248.
-40-

nations, and boding no good for a continued understanding. The
rolling of the almighty dollar was heard in every official act of
the United States Government. At the outbreak of the 'i^ar with
Spain cowardice and inefficiency were said to be characteristics
of the American army and navy. One journal referred to the
Government as "an administration which is so corrupt and so com-
pletely at the mercy of the most pecunious personal influences".
The Kaiser's gift of a statue of iJ'rederick the Great was not
erected with becoming promptness; the iCaiser's picture was hung
in a dark corner of the i^rooklyn Public Library; his gifts to the
Germanic i^iuseum at harvard were housed in a barn. I'hese were some
of the mole hills v/nich the Agrarian press made into mountains, in
the effort to preclude any further trade relations which would
work to agrarian disadvantage. I^ot all editors and public men
took this view - Dr. Theodor i^arth for example, - but they were
in the minority. Dr. i^arth was a Liberal leader in the Reichstag
who had consistently opposed the restrictions on -American pro-
ducts. In 1888 he founded Lie Nation to voice his opposition to
Bismarck, and had urged better relations with America. i3ut grad-
ually German feeling was becoming hostile to the United iitates.
And while other factors entered, this state of affairs was large-
ly the work of the Agrarian leaders, who, according to the
Chancellor, Prince ^ohenlohe, "would like notiing better than to
19
embroil us witli every nation that sends us foodstuffs."
19. von Schierbrand in ^entury 42:158, May 1902,
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4. Trade with the United i^tates.
'I'his hostile position would have been more tenable had
Germany been less dependent upon America, iiut arnong the imports
from -ii-merioa necessities bulked very large, with raw cotton com-
prising about 50^0 of the total, un the other hand, the exports
to America consisted largely in beet sugar (until 1902 j and
20
chemicals, toys, textiles, and china. And the balance of trade
became continually more unfavorable to Germany. The protection-
20. The following tables (I) from the u.o .gtatiscal Abstract for
1904, and (11) from the iStatistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche
Reich 1904, ch. VII, compiled by -^r. xioward in The Cause and
Extent of the Recent Industrial Progress of Germany, show
to wbat extent this is true.
I Total Exports to Germany, 1903 II Total -t-xports to U.i3. 1903
§193,841 ,63 6 pl7 ,300,000.
Of which the follov/ing are items:
Cotton $ 84,824,284 Cotton goods § 14,372,600
lard 15,448,598 Silk Goods 9,861,500
Wheat 11,114,840 Procelain 6,016,600
Corn 6,642,397 Dyes and dye 4,237,000
Mineral oil 6,368,076 stuffs
Tobacco 5^850,361 Toys 4,172,750
i'lour :-(|;&S0,lS6 Gloves 2,819,250.
Bacon 1,339,119
21. jj'rom the U.S .Statiscal -tibstract
,
1904, p. 98, 1914, p. 320
Fiscal Year -i^xports to Germany Imports from Balance
Germany
1695 I 92,053,753 81,014,065 11,039,688
1900 187,34 7,889 97,374,700 89,973,189
1905 194,220,472 118,268,356 75,952,116
1910 249,555,926 168,806,137 80,760,789
1914 344,797,276 189,919,136 154,875,140
42-

ists demanded a tariff war to bring America to her knees; but wiser
heads realized that the United States held by far the more strate-
gic position, that such rivalry would be suicidal, and that only
b,v the give and take of reciprocal agreemenLs could the two coun-
tries get on. i<'rom the German point of view the situation was an
i :passee
,
the realization of which did not contribute to i^erman
friendship for America. And the "American invasion" was threaten-
ing industry as well as agriculture.
One of the big issues in German-American diplomacy was the
interpretation of the most- favored-nation clause of the treaty of
1628. Article V of this treaty provides:
"JSo higher or other duties shall be imposed on the importa-
tion into tne United states cf any article the produce or manufacture
of Prussia, and no higher or other duties shall be imposed on the
importation into the kingdom of Prussia of any article the produce
or manufacture of the United States, than are or shall be payable
on the like article being the produce or manufacture of any other
foreign country "
Further, Article IX provides:
"If either party shall hereafter grant to any other
nation any particular favor in navigation or commerce, it shall
immediately become common to the other party, freely, wliere it is
freely granted to such other nation, or on yielding the same com-
pensation, when the grant is conditional."
From the time of -L'homas Jefferson, the first iiecretary of
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state, i-Jid oiiG of tlio A;norican envoys who took part in drawing
up the similar provisions of the treaty of 1785, dov/n to the
present it lias consistently been held hy the Department of State
thut in commercial treaties the provisions of Article IX modify
the most-favored -nation clause. A reciprociV treaty is consid-
ered not a favor, hut a hargain, and as Article 12 states, anoth
nation may make a similar bargain by making eq.-'jivalent conces-
sions. The only exception to this principle in American Commer-
cial treaties is the treaty of 1850 with the Sv/iss Uonfederation
which placed no condition on the most-favored-nation clause;
when a question of interpretation arose, these clauses were ab-
rogated. I'hus the American L^ovornaent h^.s maintained a con-
sistent stand on the question.
The txernmn C:^overnment held, on severctl occasions, tliat
Article V was not restricted by Article IX, and that under the
fomer any concession made by the United States under a reci-
procity treaty, at the same time accrued to the benefit of a
mo St
-favored-nation vathout any compensation or concession on
its part.^^
The interpretation of this part of the treaty of 1828 be-
cajne a mooted point in 1894. The v/ilson act of that year re-
pealed the provisions of tlie McKinley Act of 1890 and took
sugar from the free list. jj*urther, in Schedule ii]-182-| it pro-
22
.
i'oreign Kelations, 1899, pp. 298, 300-1.
25. For a study of tiiis see article by M . I. Stone in fiorth
American Keview, 182:433-45, Llarch 1906. View of Germ.:n
txovemment is expressed in Jj'o reign Kel-.tions, 1899, p. 300
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vided for an additional duty for 1-10 cent per pound on sugar
tfhicii v/as supported "by a bounty in the oouatry where it was pro-
duced; and t:d.s applied to i^erni--n sugar. The u-ar;jan i/ovornjnont
protested to tlie countervailing duty both as a violation of the
most-favored-nation clause and of the Saratoga Agreement, The
American overmien t hold that the latter was only a bargain, and
might be terminated by a change of conditions. The liemian govern-
ment at tlie tine, be it noted, held the 'Saratoga Agreement to be
a permanent arrangement. Under the mo st-favored-nati on clause
however. Secretary 'vrresham considered the complaint to be well
founded, and the President referred it to congress with a re-
commendation that the countervailing duty be removed, neverthe-
less, the repeal was defeated in Congress. Jiut insurrection in
Cuba cut down the supply of sugar from that quarter, aoi tiemian
24
sugar exports to the United States rose in spite of the duty.
In 1897 while the Dingley bill was befor,e congress, the
vierman Ambassador renewed the complaint which his government had
been voicing since 1894. His argument was based on two points:
(1) That a countervailing duty was contrary to tlie rights of a
most-favored-natL on, and (2) That such treatmeflit w^s contrary
to the exchange of notes of August 22, 1891,i.e. , the Saratoga
24. ^6,099,213 in 1895
10,434,172 in 1896
,
27,636,433 in 1897
U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1904, p. 35G
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Agreement."^ In reply the Socret .ry of State, lir. bhoruBn,
hold first, that not only had tho American tiovemment consistent-
ly held such a countervailing duty to be an in torn, 1 affair
not connected with most-favored
-nation relations, hut the offi-
cial (ierman representative at the international sugar conference
of 1888, who happened to be no other tlian uount Hazfeldt, had
expressly coranitted himself to the same view, as had the British
representative. In the second place, LIr. Sherman stated that the
Saratoga Agreement had no connection with the question, having
been only a bargain which was terrainated by the act of 1894.
The Dingley bill became a law, not vjlth an additional duty
of 1-10 cent on bounty-fed sugar, as the act of 1894 provided,
but it levied "an additional duty equal to the net amount of
such bounty or grant, however the same be paid or bestowed. "^'^
The value of beet sugar imports from l:r3rmany dropoed from
$27,636,433 in 1897 to only ^2,656,135 in 1898. This, however,
was partly due to the overstocking of the American market in an-
ticipation of the new tariff, for in 1899 the flipire v/as
^13,808,655.^®
The menace of an "American invasion" had been threatening
Central iilurope for some tiae. The uingley tariff, coincidently
with crop failures in iilurope and good crops in Amezica, produced
25. if-oreign relations, 1897, n. 175 et seq.
26. ibid. p. 178, et seq.
27. u.b. Statutes 1897, t)5th ijon?;. 1st boss. p. 205
^8. U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1904, p. 350. i^ee also jj-oreism
relations, 1897, p. 180. ^
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a loud anti -Araer ican uproar. Opposition to the growin^^ depondence
upon America v/as preached not alono by tno UGrinan agrarians,
but by statesmen throughout iiiurope. Against what aopeared a oom-
mon danger even rrance aM trermany took council together.
±Jy this tine the uernian jj'oreign Office was almost inextri-
cably involved in its attitude toward the most-favored-nati on
29
clause. In theoiy it maintained, in short, that a bargain '^ith
one nation must become a gift to eveiy most favored nation. In
practice it was less consistent, as the following cases go to
prove. llj In 1885, a concession was granted to Italy and Spain
which v/as not extended to the united iitates. (2) In 1884 Spain
and the United states entered into a reciprocity agreement 7/hich
admitted free sugar from Porto nloo and uuba. in 1885 j^ismarcfe
asserted in the Keichstag that the v^erman crovernment was entitled
to similar trea-cment as a most favored nation, and xen days later
the merman liovemment made a concession to Spain, and this time
it extended the low rates to the united states gratis. I3j In
1891 tile low grain rates of tne uaprivi treaties did not accrue
to tne united states gratuitously, but, it v/ill be recalled, in
exchange for a concession, namely, -go continue v^erman sugar on
the free list. At the time the German irovernment considered it
a bargain. (4) In 1897, the German Foreign Secr3ti.,ry, realizing
that the Saratoga Agreement was inconsistent with Germsxiy'
s
expressed views on Article Y of the treaty of 1828, asserted in
29. See M.I.Stone in North American Heviev/ 182:433-45 Mar., 1906
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tne Reichstag that this agreement was merely explanatory ol' tlie
treaty, thax it created no now situation, and that the government
was already ohligated to extend the "benefits o±' the Gaprivi
treaties gratuitously to America. (5) In 1B98, when the i<'rench
and Ajuerican G-oveminents entered a reciprocity arrangement under
provisions of the Dingley Act, Germany claimed the same rights
with no concession. But the American Government could not agree
to tnis,and on July 10, 1900 the '^eiman Government made a
commercial agreement on a hasis of reciprocal concession, and
thereby admitted American goods at the minimum tariff.
From the ahove it is seen that the opportunist policy of
the Jf'oreign Office in this respect was productive of no result
satisfactory to the Agrarian League, for the upshot of every
agreement with America was the granting of a favor in order to
secure a favor in return.
ITor must it be thought that the American tariff worked
hardsMp only on the farmers. I'he high tariff which protected
American industry effectively closed our ports to many articles
of German manufacture, and made the exportation of others pos-
sihle only on a narrow margin. ^Ir. Arnold, hetter knovm as
"Vigilans sed Aequus" of the Spectator, computed that the A^iieri-
can tariff decreased the i:rerman textile operative's income by
ten "0 ereen t.
50. The Spectator 90:570, Iviarch 7, 190S.
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Trade relations bet^.eoi Ainorica and G-orrnuny rni,^ht almost
be said to resolve tmmselves into an intermittent controversy
over C:^erman sugar and American meat. .Vhen the so-called sanitary
restrictions were removed September 3, 1891 as a result cd:' the
Saratoga Agreement, the meat question was not permanently settled;
for on October 31, 1894, Baron Saurma informed the Secretary of
State that since I'exas fever had "been found to exist in two sep-
arate cargoes of American cattle, the further importation of cat-
tle and fresh beef from the United States was prohihited. To
this the A.iierican (government remonstrated, showing that Aiiierican
cattle had for years "been free from this disease, and ttat from
one to four thousand head of cattle had annually been shipped
to Europe for fifteen years v/ith no untoward resiit. In the
fall of 1898 a meat inspection bill was dravm up in Germany
which provided, in part, for the opening of packages oi' canned
meat for examination. The North (German Qazette of December 21,
1898, in referring to this bill said "It deals therefore with a
matter which is purely (xerraan, and wMch imposes upon us a task
in the accomplishment of which we alone are concerned," a remark
which was conceded to be addressed to America. ^'"^ More favorable
was the stand of the Vossische Zeitung {L!ay 7, 1899 j which regret-
ted the motives of self-interest wMch prompted the Agrarians
to support meat inspection only when applied to foreign meat,
and said "7/e desire to retain control by the sanitary police,
but we do not wish to have the sanitary police control discredit-
ed by using it for protective-tariff purposes." The bill was
31. Foreign Relations, 1900, p. 486. •
______
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a l)urnine: question for a ye: r aM a half. iVhen referred to a
Goranittee it m:.s amended by the Agrarians in a way calculated to
protect their interests. The industrial elements in society,
having little fuitn in the sincerity o± the alleged reform, used
their political influence to prevent any unreasonable restrictions
viiile the Agrarian Party, in and out of Parliament, almost over-
did their efforts to influence the Government. A compromise was
finally reached between the two factions which also insured cer-
tain votes lor the new navy bill, and the measure became a law
after a purely party vote. The Act was promiagated Ivlay 22, 1900.
In addition to many other restrictions, sausage and similar can-
32
ned meats were prohibited unconditionally. American meats
continued to suffer from these and other restrict ions, as Mr.
Gerard found when he went to Berlin.
American fruits com rise another class of articles which
suffered heavily from German sanitary inspection. In 1894 the
officials of various cities were talcing steps to exclude Amer-
ican dried fruit wnich contained, it was asserted, an injurious
amount of metallic zinc. In this, as in the case of American
meats, the most obvious argument in favor ox the article was that
it was eaten in America with no harmful results. T^ere was med-
ical testimony to the effect that the small amount of zinc present
was not injurious. On February 1, 1«98, I^Ir. \?hite. had to inform
32. Foreign Relations, p. 508.
33. Gerard: IJy Jj'our lears in u-ermany, p. 26 9.
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the tne State Denartmen t tJia,t a minis torial decree prohibited
any further importation ol Ajnerican dried iridt. Simultaneously
with tiiis action against dried friiit from Ajnerica it was discover-
ed that the San Jose scale was "being introduced by the importa-
tion of fresh fridt. Consignments oi apples were opened aid
samples examined, vdth the result in general of finding them
in satisfactory condition. Dried fruit was also found by the
German (government to be inieoted, and was also made the subject
of restrictions. I'his sanitary precaution was waived in the
Reciprocity agreement of 1900. But discrimination against
24dried fruit was again an issue in 1915.
Still another subject of unpleasant diplomatic correspon-
dence was the action taken by the Prussian Government in 1890
to exclude American insurance companies maintaining branch
houses in Prussia, i'rom the point of view oi these companies
it appeared that for some tnne restrictions ot ever- increasing
severity had been put upon their operations under their Prussian
concessions. One company was required to invest lialf of its
receipts from Prussian business in Prussian consoles at lov;
rates or interest. Finally a decree specifying the foim for
annual statement was issued, binding on both foreign and
domestic companies, uut working to the singular disadvantage ox
the former. A limited time was -:;iven tp comply. At tliis junc-
ture the aid oi the Department of State was solicited, nego-
tiations progressed "dilatorily", as Bismarck used to say.
34. For the Oorrespondence see Foreign Kelations, 1898, p. 507
et seq.
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Several oi tno insuranoe coramiss ionors in Ajiijrican States,
through otficial cnamiels and otnorwise, threatoned reprisals on
tne iionaan companies in Auierica. The Ajaerioan com anies were
excluded, and the threatened retaliation was carried into effect.
Some time later the GemBn Grovernnient :jent agents to zhe United
States to invesxig-ate the insurance comjanies, and in the fall
01 1699 they were again admitted in Prussia.
There remain lor consideration the reciprocity agreements
entered into hetwean 1900 and 1914. V/hen Count von BtLlov/ he-
came Imperial Chancellor he was aware tiiat it was ap:rarian op-
position which had caused the retirement of Couni. Hohenloho.
Thus political expediency as v/ell as his own predilections point-
ed the new cmncellor to a policy of increased agrarian protect-
ion. The Oaprivi treaties v/ere soon to expire, and for several
years there had "been discussion lavoring an upv/ard revision
of the tariff at tne time. A long parliamentary contest ensued,
in r/hich the Fvee Traders under the leadership of Dr , iiarth
and Professor j^rentano suffered a deteat by the passage of the
new tariff act of 1902, i^roviding for greater protection to
agriculture. In i^'ehruary 1905, the Serman '.:rOV3rnment concluded
the last of seven reciprocity treaties v/ith neighboring jJuropean
states.
On Iloveraber 29, 190d, Jiaron von Sternburg, the German Ara-
hassador at Washington, gave notice that his government wished xo
terminate tne reciprocal agreement of 1900 on Inarch 1, 1906.
Shortly tnerearter negotiations were undertaken, wMch developed
into the commercial agreement of 1906, v/nerehy the United States
received the same favorable duties accorded hy tiie recent treaties

v/itn Kussia and otnor ii'itions, and in return lowered in favor of
Germany the Ainerloan duties on certain liquors, crude tartar,
oil i^intings and water colors and a fev/ otner articles. Also,
a change \ms made in tlie consular regulations at the request of
the Gorman A^aliassador . This agreement was for a period of twelve
months or longer.
Count von iiiilow appeared to have come off empty handed,
and loud was the outcry or the agrarian party, iiut since the
Jnited states was not dependent on lierman sugar its economic
position was unassailable. The chancellor was given clearly
to undersxand that he was on prolDation for twelve months in this
matter, and must not again fail in his negotiaTiions
.
In 1907 another temporary agreement was made, containing
an expression of a desire to execute at a later tune a compre-
hensive commercial treaty. The concessions on the part of the
United States were identical with those of the year "before, save
tmt champagne and all otner sparkling wines were added to the
list on which lower duties were to he allowed. Moreover, the
ustoms Kegulations v/ere amended oy exec .itive order in a v/ay v/hich
made them more agreeahle to ^lerrnan trade. In return for these
concessions, the ijerriian liovemment again extended her minimum
tariff to American goods. It appears that isaron von Sternhurg,
the ^jerman Amhassador, was also nopeful that the Uastoms Adminis-
trative Act would Oq amended in a way v/hich would have lavored
liemian commerce, for on the day Stemhurg signed the agreement.
Secretary tioot wrote that he v/as authorized to say that the
-53-
r
Pro si dent vroiild rGcoiiiinand such action to uongress, J3iit tJiore was
clearly no ooligation congress to do tliis under the agreement,
and tn.0 desired action as not taken by Dongress. This recipro-
city agreement continued in i'orce until February 7, 1910, v/hen
it expired under provisions of tno new Ajiierican tariff Act of
August £), 1909.
The tarifi of 1909 introduced maximum and minimum provisions,
tne former "being in all cases 2£))o in addition to tne latter,
section 2 of tne act orovided tnat tne President might hy pro-
clamation extend miniimm rates to foreign nations whose tariff
laws imposed no terras or restrictions wiiicn discriminated against
American goods. The u-erman u-ovemment continued to comply with
tnese provisions, and on Llarcn 7, 1910, tne day when the agreement
or ly07 expired, i'resident xaft proclaij-ned that the minimum rates
of the new act were to be exteiried to lierman goods.
On October 3, 1913, the underwood Tariff became a law. jieing
a downward revision, it was, of course, to the advantage of ^rerr.iaiy
However, some adverse criticism on particular provisions was made
in ^iermany daring tne discaosion wnloti preceded its passage. The
outbreaic of tne i^Juropean fiar, and tne consequent ODStriiction to
^erm^n trade, brougnt to a close any further disoTossion of tne
American tariff ;.^nd <or;.rman exports. Owing to the peculiar con-
ditions in Doth countries trade relations nad never become stab-
ilized.
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4. A Central -iJiiropeaii ZollvorGin.^
The oiitoreaJc o±' ziie war in i^urope, wJiion cut ofi a large
parx of tno tjorraan -Amor ican "Drade, soon snov/od tnat eaoh nation
iuid deijended largely on tne otner. isui, an analysis oi tne arti-
cles of import and export for years previous snows tnax America
v;as far less dependent on b-errnany t^Jan ^xerraany iiad Deen on iUner-
ica. xuis fact, and tho growing unfavorable balance of trade,
created a situation that had long "boen a cause of dissatisfaction
to the uerinan people
. To obviate it tv/o plans had been urged.
One, on the part of hot-headed agrarians, was a tariff war to
bring America to her knees, iiiit ^t was only necessary to recall
that about half tne t^orman imports consisted of cotton, which was
a necessity to the mills of (Germany, to show tbf^-t for liermany aloiB
siJch an act v;ould be suicidal.
A more feasible plan was for years discussed in Central
Europe - namely, a Zollverein which would bind the several nations
into a unit strong enough to storm the impregnable commercial
position of the united States. At first, this was advocated by
Free I'raders, and for tliis reason, as well as the necessity it
implied of lowerin;^ the bars to a^Ticultural products from Austria
Hungary, made the agrarians frown on the oroposal. But as the
danger from America loomed larger, German agrarians mde common
catise with the agricultiiral interests in Austria -Hungary, and
urged a union. Siich a plan appealed to many lier^mns as only a
35. jj'or a survey of the sentiment on this proposal up to 1898
see article by Prof, j^'islc in John Hopkins University Studies
in Hist, and Pol.Sci. Series IX ITos. ll-l;d ,|jov. -Dec. 1902.
-55-

natural course of proceduro. i-'russia hud "begun vath a ZollvorGin
binding together the several iirovinces of which it v/as composed;
then the various ^jorman states were gathered in; A-LStria was ex-
cluded only to assure I'ruGsian hegemony; now what was more logical
than to complete this provincial-state-federal policy hy an inter-
national sequel?
Against the measure there were insuperahle obstacles. Tliere
were administrative difficulties, such as an eqiitahle division
of customs receipts among the several states. There were the
jealousies among the various states; if the Dual Monarchy got on
with such difficulty, wliat could be ex-pec ted of a Central
European Union? i'inally, there v/ere the irreconcilable jealousies
of interests. The agrarians, as vze sav/, were strong in opposition
when, in the early nineties, the vjian appeared disadvantageous
to them; it was only \7hen they saw a pecuniaiy advantage for tliem-
selves that they advocated it. So long as advantage to special
interests was regarded as more important tlian the good of the
whole, a Central iiluropean Zollverein was impracticable. The
idea of standing, self-s efficient, against the world was never
given up. It is the thesis of Dr. Uaujjiann' s "Llittel jjiuropa"
and belongs in tl]iit voluminous category of events wMch might well
have happened had the European war ended differently.
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IV
Gmi/^NY, AI,Iij]RIOA, AM) SAMOA.
1. The Situation in Samoa Prior to 1885.-^
ThG recent era of colonization offers few if any instances
where the "white man' s burden" has "been horne less capahly than
in Sanioa during the period with which our study is concerned.
The history of American interference in Samoa - a departure from
the traditional policy of isolation and non-interference - is
marked "by no event more creditahle tlian the diplomatic action
"by v/hich the United ;Dtates finally extracted itself from the
muddle
.
In 1872 Uommander Meade, u.S.li., v/hile on a cruise in the
Pacific, sailed into Pago Pago on the island of Tutuila, one
of the finest natural harhors of the Pacific. At the solicita-
tion of the chief of the natives on tne island, Meade entered
into a treaty, wlierehy Pago Pago v;as ceded to the United St:.tes,
while Meade agreed that tiie United States should extend its friend-
ship and protection over the island. In doing tliis the officer
acted with no authority from his government, and though President
(irant transmitted the agreement to the Senate, it v/as never
ratified, uut of course, the provisions of the United St;::.tes
1. The samoan archipelago comprises fourteen islands vd. th a pop-
ulation of ahout 39,000, of v/hora some bOO are vtiites. The
natims rank high among the Polynesians "being simple, hos-
pitable, and good fighters when provoked. The vegett-„tion
on the islands makes the task ox finding food a simple
matter for the natives. The archipelago is about 1600 miles
from Auckland, iJev/ Zealand, and 4200 from San ji'rancisco. Apia
is by far the most important town.
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Constitution relative to malcing treaties wero wholly unknown
2
to tho aamoan chief, viio considered the treaty to toe in force.
jj'or years the united atates had inaintained a consular agent
at Apia, and now, on account of a growing interest in tho island
group, it was decided to send a corainissioner to inyostigate and
report on conditions, uolonel A.£5.SteinbergGr was selected, and
in 1874 he visited the islands. On his return he rendered an
enthusiastic report, and as he was desirous of returning he v/as
authorized to do so at his own expense, carrying v/ith him some
presents and a letter to the chiefs from the President of the
United states. This letter expressed the regard Miich the govern-
ment entertained for the welfare of the people of Samoa, but commit
ted it to nothing more tangible than friendship.^
Jtlow Mr. ateinberger returned to Samoa by way of Hamburg,
where he placed himself in the service of ^iodeffroy and uompany,
a trading firm waioh operated a large plantation in Samoa. ±$ut
Mr. Steinberger had not beeii in Apia long before remarkable
events began to occur, jj-or ;:ome years the leadership in Samoa
had been disputed between the rival houses of Llalietoa and
Tupua, \'«iile the former was divided m thin itself. Jvlr. stein-
berger, on his return, persuaded the people that two rival kings
were a troublesom esuperfluity , and in 1875 a neiv constitution
was drawn up, providing for a ne?/ system of government.
2. roreign relations, 1894, App. I p. t)05.
3. ibid, 1889, p. 229; 1894, App. I. p. 505.
4. ibid, 1894, App. I. p. 50o; roster: American xHplomacy in tho
Orient, pp. 588-9.
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The kingship was to rost jointly in the two groat houses of
iviatietoa aiid xupua, and the two heads should alternate in the
Kingship for terras of four years. JVIatietoa Laupopa hecame the
first iling, A House of x^ohles and a House of iiepresentatives
took the place of the two councils of chieftans by v«4iich the
natives had carried on such govemiaent as they had had up to that
time, rinally, the office of premier was created, to he filled
by appointment of the Jling. xhe Premier v/as to act for the iLing
5
in all matters, and had tne privilege of addressing either house.
Needless to say, ivir. ateinherger had himself appointed to this
powerful office.
The ir'remier was the povver behind the throne, tlis emhodimant
of the new government, and in tne exercise of his power he De-
came unpopular with the American and x^ritish factions, with
the consent of tne K.ing, tne American consul and the commander
of a iiritish man-of-war at Apia kidnapped Ivlr. Steinherger and
deported him to Jj'iji. The parliament resented this unconstitu-
tional action, and promptly deposed King ilalietoa. Thus the
artificially elaborate scheme of government collapsed, and the
natives gave themselves over to the joys of civil strife.
Alarmed at the growing strength of the disaffected elements,
the government sent a deputation of chiefs to Jj'iji to request
the iiritish C:rovernment to proclaim a protectorate and establish
order. Thej^jbeturned without having accomplisned their object,
5, jj'oreign Relations, 1889, p. 282 et seq.
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and in tho same year, 1877, one IHaraoa, was sent as Envoy to
Washington to make a similar request of the American (Government.
Tho visit did not bring the desired result. But that it might
not seem wholly oblivious to tho honor paid it, the (ioverrLment
of the United States negotiated a treaty by which it v/as given
exclusive rights in the harbor of Pago Pago, and most-favored-
nation treatment throughout the islands, while in return it
agreed zo use its good offices to bring about a settlement of any
international dispute in which Samoa might become involved. This
treaty was signed at 7/ashington on Januaiy 17, 1878. On January
24 and August 28, 1879, the (merman and ±5ritish Grorernaments re-
spectively completed similar treaties v/ith Samoa.
The parliamentary government became discredited and in
Ivlay 1879 an uncle of the deposed Zing, Imown as Malietoa Telavou,
was crovmed King by tho opposition. Kenewed v/arfare was inevita-
ble, and the consuls at Apia hastened to secure a joint agree-
ment to respect the rights and property of neutrals. In August,
the consuls recognized the de_ facto government; of iilalietoa
Telavou.
The unanimous desire of the British, (German , and Americaa
consuls at Apia was to prevent any nation other than tneir own
to becom.e predominant. At this time a British protectorate
seemed quite possible, and the U-erman and American agents felt
called upon to maintain a balance of power. Hence in 1877
and again in 1878 tne American flag was hoisted over the islands
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and a protectorato proclaimed. In "both cases the action was re-
pudiated by the Ajiierican brovernnient •
Late in 1880 Malietoa Telavou died, and was succeeded "by
his nephew, Llalietoa Laiipepa, the former iling. His title v/as
opposed by a chief named Tamasese. Hit the forraer ^^ained consid'
erable support, and on July I'd, 1881, a series of conferences
were brought to a successful conclusion, whereby Tamasese became
vice-King, and lilalietoa was universally accepted. This is
knovm as the Lackawanna peace, having been reached through tne
efforts of Captain «jrillis, of the U.S.S. Lackawanna, then in
Samoan waters. The peace thus established was respected imtil
January, 188&.
2. Renev/ed Unrest,
^ince the summer of 1879 the government of the city of Apia
had been left in the hands of three consuls by the warring
factions. And if the consuls could have acted in accord, this
policy would have produced tolerable results. But a nev/ G-erman
consul, a Dr. Steubel, became closely allied with the manager
of the large (^erman trading firm wMch was by far tne most im-
portant business concern in Samoa, and put himself at the
Company's disposal in getting greater concessions. I'hus in the
latter part of 1884, we find the consul engaged in a hei;.ted
6. Foreign Relations, 1889, p. 296, et seq.
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00 rrespondence with King tlalietoa over allogod injasticos to
German subjects. Moreover, his overhearing manner in demanding
the signature of the King to a new treaty with t:^or;iiany, v/Mch he
would not allow the King to read before signing, made Ziie desire
of the Seimoan Uovemraent for British annexation more strong than
7
ever. The treaty was unwillingly signed in Hovemher, 1884.
King llalietoa informed the British and American consuls of
tills, stating that he was signing under compulsion, and reassert-
ing his desire of i^ritish annexation. It may easily he under-
stood that the King may have been irresponsible, and timt the
Imperial consul might have had some reason for becoming impatient*
But, especially in the absence or any considerable grievance,
there was no justification for his dragooning manner, nor for
the step which he next took. On Januaiy 2S, 188d, he informed
the King that pending an agreement whereb./ the protection of
German interests would be insured, the municipality of Apia
v/ould be occupied thc-t morning by a force of Gerinan officers and
seamen from a vessel in the harbor. This action, of course,
infringed upon tbe rights of the other governments, and repre-
sentations v/ere promptly made by the American Government to the
Imperial ^-overnraent. Early in February, 1885, the acH on of Dr.
Steubel v/as disavov/ed through the Imperial Foreign C>ffice.
But the consul continued to carry out this policy throughout the
year. As a counter-demonstration, the American consul, Green-
baum, proclaimed an American protectorate. Again the Department
V. i'oreign Kelations, 1889, p. 300 et seq.
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of state repudiated the act.
Tills situation was apparently one wnich came under the
article in the treaty between the United States and Samoa wnich
promised tno use ol ,^ood oif ices where necessary. Accordingly,
the Department of State, in complaining against Dr. SteulDel's
conduct, went farther, and proposed that the British and Grorraan
a;:-i"bassadors he authorized to confer with Ilr. Bayard, the Secre-
tary of State, with a view to making some more satisfactory
Q
arrangement. The proposal was accepted with the suggestion
that each power first send a co;:miissioner to study and report
upon conditions in Samoa. Tiiis was accepted.
In April, 1886, a German squadron under Admiral ICnorr came
to Apia. Lialietoa petitioned tne admiral for a relief from the
arrogant conduct of the Lrerman consul, iiut that ofticer, taking
the side of the consul, replied tmt he had not come to investi-
gate the Zing's difficulties, and gave him a sharp reprimand.^
During this time the disaffected memhers of the island Kingdom
had heen congregating under the banner of Tamasese, the vice-
King, who was in open revolt. IJoy/ the German admiral moved
his squadron to the diron.n'hold of Tamasese, where a hand was
landed and paraded &m, a conference v/as held v/ith Tamasese. The
insujTgent was tnus given encouragement in defying the government.
8. i-'oreign delations, 1894, App. I. p. 507.
9. ibid. 1889, p. 506, et seq.
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The commissioners made an investigation in the smnmer oi:
1866, and then the grouiid was clear for a series ol' conferences,
at JashinA-ton. In J-uno and July, IbbY, several meetings were
held, in which two plans were proposed. Kecalling the lack oi
political capacity on the part of the Samoans, tne ijemu.n Am-
"bassador proposed that the interests ot all concerned vrould he
best served by the appointment, hy tnat power whose commerce vdth
Samoa was the most important, of an adviser to the King, viio
would in fact manage tne government. This, ol course, would
place tne U-overnnient of Samoa in xne hands of the appointee of
tne German Government. I'he Jiritish Ainhassador was also in favor
01 tnis solution. I'he American proposal was that tne King should
be assisted in executing the laws Dy a council composed of three
foreign advisers, one to be named by each oi" the powers, and the
King and vice-King ex-oificio; zne salaries oi these advisers v/ere
to be met by the Sstmoan liovernraent
,
thereby mailing the advisers
free from obligation to a foreign, goverment. The t;!-erman kra-
bassador thought this would not prevent friction betv/een rival
interests. On July 25, conferences were broken off, to allov/
the conferees to consult tneir governments. It had been the
understanding tnat during the conference the status quo would
be respected by all parties. The government of the United
States considered that, no expression to the contrary being
made, this would continue to be the case during the summer. Far
from abiding by tnis understanding, tne merman ijovernment pro-
ceeded i;iimed lately to act independently in Samoa. For alleged
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wrongs Gorainitted. against ^iomian subjects by King Llaliotoa, all
being events prior to tho meeting of tno conierence at Washington,
tne consul in Apia was instructed to declare war "upon King i.ial-
iatoa personally. Tlie l 'rmer vico-icing, Taraaseso, was pro-
claimed King. I'he U-errnan squadron was sent throughout tlie archi-
pelago to carry native chiefs who landed at various points, and
under the authority of the G-erman conLnai ders
,
proclairaed The nev/
King. A chaplain on the H.I.Gr.M.S. Sophie v/rote how one village,
remaining loyal xo the rightful King, refused to receive the
representatives oi Tamasese, and the village was "destroyed "by
fire for its disooedience , its inhabitants having fled preci-
pitately to the "bush before the landing of the armed boats."
There is little wonder that the natives, upon a second visit of
the Sopnie hastened to manifest their entire loyalty. ""^"^ After
a brief resistance, the Ex-King ivialietoa, wisning to save furtiier
bloodshed, gave nimself up to the v:fGrii]ans , and was deported on
the cruiser. Adler, A former u-erjiian artillery officer, Jiran-
deis, who had been employed by the German firm in Samoa for
some time, was made sole adviser to Tamasese, and the power be-
hind the throne.
I'ive days after war nad actually been declared upon ivialie-
toa, and thus considerably after such action had been decided
upon at ±5erlin, the lierman Amhassador informed Mr. iSayard tnat his
10. See article by Talcott Williams in Viorld' s worlc, ob:116 et seq
11. JJ'oreign x^elations, IbBB, o. o92, et seq.
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government intended to act alone to protect its interests, and
migiit liave to depose tlio present Jling. Thus tno status quo was
not observed as agreed, nor was the united States (iovornriien'o in-
foriiied in time to protest. Mr. i^ayard again took occasion to
point out tiXit the interests oi the United otates were not cora-
mercial but purely altruistic; that whereas the u-erraan Uovorninent
urged tne weakness ox tne Samoan government as an excuse I'or a
high-handed policy, the American irovemraent thougnt tnis all the
more reason why the government set up in Samoa should he impar-
tial and 01" sucn a character as to develop, not awari, any poli-
tical ability the natives might nave.
The Tamasese-Jirandeis government wnich tne vxermans set up
in Mulinuu, tne Samoan capital, was too progressive to be popu-
lar. Tseing a rule set up and maintained for tne advantage oi* the
ixerman trading firm, it begsm to develop the country. It lasted
for one year. Again tne outs oanded togei^aer agains"c tne ins;
the government whicn nad been se"c up by tne deportation of the
acicnowledged Zing could not long endure. And tne ±5ritish and
American consuls, merely reflecting the consternation of their
home governments at the outrageous conduct of tne o-ermans, freely
deplored the existing conditions, but advised tne natives to
bide their time aiid ayoid bloodsned.
A new pretender oecame active in August Ibbb , a chief namea
li/Iataafa, As a demonstration against renewed nosuilities the
Adler patrolled tne coasts and opened fire upon villages Imovm
to oppose Tamasese, Jiiataaia' s forces tooic tne field against tne
government at Mulinuu. The Adler attempted to interfere, and
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and (Japtani Loary ol tiie u.s.b. Adajns, intervoning to seo lair
play, "GooK an axxixudo wnicn leit it only possiDlo for tne (jerman
commander oo desist or xi^nt a more suixaole enemy tJ:t,vn native in-
surgent s."'"^
in beptemDer, Ilataaxa attaciced Mulinuu. xlie government forcee
under ex-uaptain x^ranaeis intrenched their position. Seamen
were landed from the German ships. ii\xt Ilataafa was successfiil
in his attack. Ivlartial law was declared "by the irsrman uonstil,
asserting that it applied even to American and British citizens.
The following telegram was sent to Washington: "Three war ships
undertaken to disarm liiataafa. Landed at night force to prevent
retreat. liataafa' s men fired on and forced to fight, trermans
routed. Twenty killed, tMrty VAiunded. u-ermans swear vengeance.
Shelling and "burning indi scriminately regardless
of American property. Protest unheeded. Natives exasperated,
i'oreigners^ lives and jjro perty in greatest danger . Germans
respect no neutral territory. ... American flag -seized in Apia
harhor "by armed merman "boats, hut released. Admiral with squa-
dron necessary immediately." Americans yAio had not kno'.ra of
the existance of Samoa "before this time hecarae justly enraged.
Congress appropriated $500,000 to protect American interests.
3. The General Act of Berlin.
By Llarch, 1889, a uerman, an American, and a iiritish
12. Henderson: American Diplomatio Quest ions, pp. 238 -9
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squadron were ridin{< m tho liarbor of A jia; hostilities soeraed
inirainent. On Ilarcli 16 a typhoon destroyed all save one of these
ships, and put an end to the destruction of Lifo on land by a
greater disaster on tho water. In the face of such losses all
Samoa seemed insignificant.
In February, 1889, an agreement had "been reached for a re-
newal in Berlin of the conference begun in w'ashington in 1887.
The Anerican conmiissioners were John A. Jlasson, William vValters
Phelps, and ueorge H. Jiates; the latter was perhaps an unfortun-
ate Choice, as he had been the commissioner to Samoa in 1886,
and had subsequently expressed opinions not v/holly flattering to
the government which was to entertain the approaching conference.
They were instructed to VtO rk for the restoration of the status quo
ante , the organization of a stable government, a more definite
adjustment of claims and titles to land, the prohibition of the
importation of L'.lcohol and firearms, and finally some peaceful
settlement for tho management of Apia.-^^
Uegotiations were conducted from April 29 to June 14, 1889,
and resulted in the General Act of Jierlin. As the preamble sets
forth, the plenipotentiaries arrived at the following results r*^'^
i!*irst. A declaration respecting the independence
ani neutra3-ity of the islands of Samoa, and assuring to
their respective citizens and subjects equality of
rights in^ said islands, and x^roviding for the im:me-
diate restoration of peace and order therein. (Ivlalietoa
Laupepa v/as declared to be the recognized iCingi
.
Second. A declaration- resp ecting the modification
13. ii'oreign relations, 1889, p. 195, et seq. contains letter of
instructions to uommissioners from becy. Jilaino.
14. ibid. p. 353, et seq.
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of existing treaties, and the assent of the Sa;aoan
uovominent to this act. (Any inconsistent provi-
sions of any treaties, i . e
.
, of (jorniany' s treaty
obtained "by compulsion on Novemhor 10, 1884,
were to lapse j
.
T:iird. A declaration respecting the estatlish-
ment of a siiprerae court of justice for Samoa
and defining its jurisdiction. I Tho cliief justice
of Samoa was given large judicial functions, such
as decisions where tlie rights or succession of a
King were concerned, or where one of the treaty
powers was in disagreement v/ith the government of
Sajnoa. He also had advisory duties toward the native
govemjiient. )
Fourth. A declaration respecting titles to
Itind at Samoa and restraining^ the disposition there-
of by natives, and providing for the investigation
of claims thereto, and for the registration of valid
titles.
^'ifth. A declaration respecting the municipal
district of Apia, providing a local administration
therefor, and defining the jurisdiction of the muni-
cipal magistrate. (An impartial magistrate was to
he appointed jointly hy tho three powers, or in case
of disagreement from certain other nationalities, and
was to try cases arising in Apia, to advise the Sa-
moan i^overnment, to he custodian of state and muni-
cipal funds, and superintendent of the harbor.)
Sixth. A declaration respecting taxation and
revenue in Samoa, l Revenue v;as to consist of import
duties, export duties, certain annual taxes, occasion-
al taxes, and income from licenses to engage in cer-
tain kinds of business.)
Seventh. A declaration respecting arms and
ammunition, and. intoxicating liquors, restraining
their saie and use. (Natives v/ere not to be allowed
to purchase or acquire firearms or intoxicants.)
ulighth. b^eneral dispositions. { Providing £> r
the execution of the foregoini^-, and for its amend-
ment .
Iflalietoa Laupepa v/as again recognized by the powers as Zing
of Samoa, and was chosen and acclaimed by all parties in Samoa,
including Tamasese. On December 5, 1889, his flag was raised over
15
the royal residence, and was saluted by the u.S.S. Adams.
15. Lieut, uommdr. Hunlier to Secy. of imvy, ibid. p. 421.
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4. Tripartite (iovernment.
The operation of the new jovornmont was not such as to on-
ce arage the A;nerican nation to a;5;ain depart from its traditional
policy. The taxes authorized by the lieneral Act were unpopular
with the natives. The warrants of the Supreme ^o.irt were scraps
of paper to tlieir untutored rainds. A dispute arose over what
coins should be authorized as legal tender, and v/hen the Samoan
'Jovermient did not include the irermem currency, the president of
the municipal council undortoolc to coerce tlie Lrovemment. The
president found himself qriite out of harmony v/ith the natives
and the consuls, and resigned. The chief justice who should
normally have stepped in to preserve peace was in Australia at
the time. T-.is official, on another occasion, abused his almost
unlimited authority by setting aside one of the provisions of
the ireneral Act. j?inally, both the chief justice and the munici-
pal president resigned from such difficult tasks. iJiiief llataafa,
who had formerly been a partisan of ilalietoa, and \tio had led
the successful attack on Tamasese in 1886, now found the offices
of iling and vice-Jling filled by those tw) chiefs, ilataafa v/o-old
16. To call the governmental system provided by the (ieneral
Act of iierlin autonomous is clearly applying a misnomer. H'or
little power was left in the hands of the King; and the mun-
icipality of Apia, the only iriportant community in ;3amoa,
was in the hands of less thi.n 200 nualified voters. The
American ^jovernment found itself more deeply involved than
it would have cared to be. iiee Letter of becy. uresham, jj'or.
Kel. 1894, App. I. pp. 510-11.
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not be reconciled and bocajne the nucleus of opposition to the
17
existing order. Daring the suraiaor of 1893 hostilities com-
menced between the government and ivlataafa. xhe insur.-ients were
routed, and Llataafa and eleven cliiefs were captured by forces
from the liritish and lierman vessels in Apia harbor aided by some
thirty native warriors. The rebel leaders were deported by the
agreement of King i.'ialietoa and the three pov/ers.
The general act had been considered as rather a trial, or at
least as an arrangement which was subject to alteration after
three years, iiome of the residents of cJamoa, including Mr. Kobert
Loiiis Stevenson, felt that consider^ibie improvement might be made,
and attempted to give expression to tliis hope. Only the American
(roverninent toolc kindly to these suggestions. In several messages
toiOongress
, President Cleveland took occasion to comment upon
the unsatisfactoiy condition of affairs in Samoa, and regretted
tliat the nation was committed to an arrangement which might at
I ft
any time lead to trouble.
llatters wore on, however, with only the usual amount of un-
pleasantness, until Jling ivialietoa died in /iugust 1898. The pop-
ularity he had formerly enjoyed had long since evaporated, and his
rule of late had not been undisputed. The question of succession
now arose. Contenders for royal honors were Ivlataafa, who had
been returned from banishment in 1898 on his promise to maintain
17. i'oreign Relations, 1894, App. i, p. bll.
18. Ibid. 1895, p. xxxii
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the peace, Teunasese, the forraor King and vice-iCing under Ifeliotoa
Laupepa, ainl f ijially Llalietoa Tanu, the younc; son of tho dead
King. At t]]e customary election the natives, l.lataafa was
easily cliosen to "be King. Hat Tamasese and Tanu comlDined forces
and protested the election, on the ground that J^iataafa v/as ineli -
gibie because of having been exiled. This was a case wliich, by
tho lieneral Act, snould be referred to the uhief justice, feel-
ing ran high; the natives and, curioasly enough in the light of
their former conduct, the lierrnan interests favored Mataaia; while
the iiinglish and Americans believed that this change of heart on
the part of the u-ermans indicated a secret agreement with i^iataafa
which v;ould prove inimical to their own v/elfare . The American
Chief Justice reviewed the case faithfully for/eleven days, and
came to the conclusion that llataafa was forever ineli ,lble, and
that by the ISamoan customs xdalietoa Tanu was the rightful suc-
19
cesser to liis fi:other"S throne.
IJo decision would have been acceptable to all parties.
The ivlataafa forces were far superior to those opposed. The
decivsion of justice L;hambers could never stand, and tiie friends
of Ivlataafa, led, it was asserted, by ^ierman officers and the
trerman president of the Municipal uouncil, stormed the forces of
Tanu. The attack was successful, aiA i-iataafa became de facto ruler
A truce was effected in januiiry 1899, and the orovisional govern-
19. Henderson: American uiplomatic Questions, p. 268, Also Article
by n.j.iioore, a resident of Apia, in independent 51:806,
Apr. 17, 1900.
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raent was reoogiiizod for the tirno "being. A;noriGan and British
naval forces were used to maintain order, and seem to have acted
with severity in putting dom the renewed hostilities of the
Ifetaafa forces.
In April, 1899, the powers agreed upon a joint coMnission
which should go at once to tSamoa with the dual purpose of estab-
lishing order and rec oraraending action to the pov/ers. The commis-
sioners arrived c.t Apia on May 13, and at once set about their
mission. They managed to bring about the disarmament of both
factions. They acknowledged the legality of Lialietoa Tanu'
s
claim to the throne, but as that young chief resigned to complete
his education, tne commission abolished for the time at least the
office of King. Mr. Tripp, the American uomraissioner , wrote to
Jiir. hay that iMapoleon' s re;.iark - better one bad general than two
good ones - v/as very applicable to tripartite government in
bamoa.
On July 18, 1899, tne commission reported a proposed re-
vision of the taeneral Act of iserlin. The three powers agreed to
confer at '.Vashington on the proposal and the jsritish and merman
ambassadors were given full powers, wnile Mr. ns^ represented
the united states, it was the view of tl^e American and i^ritish
brovernments that some amendments would be made to the y-eneraL Act.
Jjut the merman uovemment advocated the partition of the islands,
and tnis solution was adopted. A convention, signed at Washington
u.u. on December £, 1899, and ratified by the i^enate January 16,
following, divided the islands by the 171st meridian west, and all
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Islands west oi this line were given to uoriiiany, wnile Tutuila,
witli the harbor of Pago Pago, and sovoral smaller islands east of
the meridian, was given to the united states, jsritain was given
compensation elsewhere in the Pacific ucean by uennany.
m reviewing the checkered history of American participation
in aamoan affairs there is little to corajiiend the departure
from precedent, un several occasions American interest in i^amoa,
far xrom keeping peace among the natives of the islands, canB near
to heing the cause of hostilities between the united States and
Germany, xhis is especially true during -cxie outbreak ot l«9b-9,
when, as will be remarked later, events in other comers of the
globe had made Americans distrustful of Grerman designs. By the
final treaty the American Government gained the advantage of a
naval station at Pago Pago and the greater advantage of freedom
from a connection which v/as froughtwith great danger.
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V.
THE SPANISH-AIvffiRICM WAR.
1. Grermany and the Joint i^ote to the American Government.
During the War with Spain taere were two developments which
showed a new and alarming tendency on the part of the Imperial
German trover nment - a tendency, in its relations with the united
States, to rush in where other European powers would have been
reticent to tread. Eight years earlier the astute old pilot had
been dropped, and by this time a more daring spirit seemed to
pervade German diplomacy - a headlong eagerness to plunge into a
situation before the consequences were canvassed.
It will be remembered that in the last decade of the nine-
teenth century -American industrial and agricultural products
were successfully competing in European markets, while the Ameri-
can tariff wall was lifted even higher in 1897. In the day, there-
fore, when hostilities between the united States and Spain were
imninent , the western republic was scarcely a universal favorite.
Then too, it seemed presumptuous for so young a nation to challenge
the ancient power of Spain, jj'inally, between the reigning houses
of ^pain and Austria there were close ties of kinship, while be-
tween Spain and Jj'rance were the bonds of similar language and
friendly connections of long standing, uf German friendship for
Spain we will speak later.
The American nation had for some time been deeply concerned
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with affairs in ouba. After the destxuction of the u.cj .a,i«laine
in Havana harbor in ebruary 1898, events moved rapidly. Though
warned of the gravity of the situation and the urgent need of
reform, the Spanish Government was inclined to temporize. Congress
met and was in a threatening mood, -^he -^resident hesitated to
send his message on «^uba, realizing that it might provoke war.
1
At last, April 6 was set for the delivery of the message. But
on that day came a diversion, namely a joint note from the iiritish,
German, -erench, Austrian, -"ussian and Italian Governments. The
2
text was as follows;
Washington,April 6, 1898.
The undersigned representatives of Germany, Austria-
Hungary, -c'rance, ureat Britain, Italy, and Russia, duly authorized
in that behalf, address, in the name of their respective vxovern-
ments, a pressing appeal to the feelings of humanity and modera-
tion of the President and of the American people in their existing
differences with ^pain. They earnestly hope that further negotia-
tions will lead to an agreement which, while securing the mainten-
ance of peace, will afford all necessary guarantees for the re-
establishment of order in >^uba.
I'he Powers do not doubt that the humanitarian and purely
disinterested character of this representation will be fully
recognized and appreciated by the American nation.
4
1. Mr. Day to Mr. Woodford , For . Rel.1098 p. 735
2. For. Eel. 1898, p. 740l
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The President replied as fol ows to the Amhassadors
:
The ixovernraent of the united States recognizes the good will
which has prompted the friendly communication of the representa-
tives of Germany, Aus tri a-Hungary , -c'rance, ^eat Britain, Italy,
and Hussia, as set forth in the address ofyjrour excellencies, and
shares the hope therein expressed that the outcome of the situation
in c;uba may be the maintenance of peace between the united iitates
and Spain by affording the necessary guaranties for the re-establish
ment of order in the island, so terminating the chronic condition
of disturbance which so deeply injures the interests and menaces
the tranquility of the American nation b,/ the character and con-
sequences of the struggle thus kept up at our doors, besides
shocking its sentiment of humanity.
The Government of tne united States appreciates the humani-
tarian and disinterested character of the communication now
made on behalf of the powers named, and for its part is confident
that equal appreciation will be shown for its own earnest and
unselfish endeavors to fulfill a duty to humanity by ending a sit-
uation the indefinite prolongation of wliich has become insufferable.
President Mci^inley did not send his message on April 6, but not
until April 11. xhis delay, however, was not because of the joint
note, of which the government must have been aware for some time
previous, but to insure enough time for the safe departure of ''•mer-
4ican citizens from ^j-avana. Shortly after the joint note was
3. jH*oreign Helations, 1898, p. 741.
4. Ibid. p. 743.
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wdelivered to President McXinley a note was also presented to the
Spanish Government by the representatives of the six powers, ad-
vising the proclamation of an armistice in uuba. The action
taken, by the powers can scarcely be called a common or usual pro-
ceeding
,
and Secretary oeward had even refused to entertain a
joint note from two powers, -a-nd yet, as influence was exerted on
Spain as well, it could scarcely be resented - provided that sub-
sequent conduct b<^re out the expression of a humanitarian and
purely disinterested attitude.
As the war progressed, however, the attitude of the powers
5grew less assuring. The continental press, especially in
Germany, was unfriendly. J-he semi-official weekly. Die ^irenzboten,
regretted the shameless war, and asserted that vxerman volunteers
would have to do the fighting, since the "promiscuous mob of Jing-
lishmen, half-breeds, Irish, and negroes, is too incoherent and
too unmilitary to show any soldierly cjialities." Comment favorable
to the united ^^tates was notable for its rarity. After the Spanish
disaster at i^ianila and then at Santiago the press at Madrid ex-
pressed great expectations of joint intervention by the powers to
prevent further congiest. ^he presence of a large merman force
in Manila -oay gave strength to this hope.
While the continental press was on the whole unfriendly,
and frequently vitriolic in its condemnation, and the £;uropean
Courts were coolly correct, the expressions of confidence and ap-
5. idr. Cartelyou, secretary to the President, wrote in his diary for
May 16: "The strain upon him is terrible.... the growing unrest
and threatening character of the European situation .. make the
burden upon the Executive's, shoulders a heavy one". OlcottiLife
of m, McKinley II, p. 54. ciee also the J^^.Y. Tribune for June
•12,15,17,19,20,26,1898; Le Temps for May 2,dune 13,1898; ijondon

probation from across the channel were reassuring, -Lhus Mr.
Hay wrote to the -^resident on May 4, two days before the joint
note was submitted: "If sympathy and approval from the outside
is worth anything to you, i can assure you it is yours, to the
fullest extent, from this country. There is certainly a very won
derful change in public sentiment since J- came here, a year ago.
All classes, from the throne to the man in the street, now
wish us well, i hear evidence of this from most unexpected
sources, j^arl ^rey, for instance, said yesterday, *vVhy do not
the united estates borrow our navy to maice a quick job of *^uba?
They could return us the favor another time:* i had a serious
talk: with Mr. Chamberlain last night. He is extremely desirous
of a close alliance with us, or if that is prevented by our
traditions, for an assurance of common action on important ques-
tions"; and LIT. jtLay goes on to quote Mr. chamberlain as further
saying: "I should rejoice in an occasion in which we could fight
7
side by side." on June 10, i^r. nay wrote to the iPresident
that he kept Lord ^^alisbury informed on the views of the
American ^'overnment, and that, without being asked, he had served
the -American desire for a speedy peace by sounding the coiurt at
Vienna on the attitude of the iipanish Government toward an
Times for May 3, June 12
,
1898; with quotations from the
^xerman press.
6.1^.1. Tribune May 12, June 14,15, 1898.
7.ulcott, 11 p. 130
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armistice, and received the reply that it was not ready to stop
hostilities "on even the most reasonahle terms" i^^inally, on
Au^st 2, May wrote "If we give up the -t'hilippines it will he a
9
considerable disappointment to our J^inglish friends." These con-
temporary expressions are mentioned for the light they throw upon
later events.
The joint note was eclipsed by the tremendous occurrences of
the following days and weeks, and would in all probability never
have been revived had it not been for a series of interesting
exposures in 1902. in i'ebruary of that year the Kaiser's brother,
jr'rince Henry of Prussia, paid a visit to the united states. For
some time the press on the continent and in England had commented
at great length on the approaching visit, and freely speculated as
to its purpose. The bonds between the two -ti-nglish- speaking nations
had been growing stronger in the five years previous, and in the
royal visit the i3ritish press thought it saw an attempt to strength
German-American relations at -c-ngland's expense. Each of the two
great European powers seemed to wish to monopolize America's
friendship.
In January, 1902, there appeared in (ierman newspapers articles
obviously inspired, to the effect that in the negotiations leading
up to the joint note ofApril 6, 1898, the J^ritish Ambassador at
Washington, Lord Pauncefote, had taken the lead, while Germany had
been an unwilling accomplice. It was related how the jj'oreign
8. Olcott, II, p. 151
9. Ibid. p. 135.
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Office had not thought the measure advisable, and that the i-aiser
had noted on the margin of a dispatch relating to intervention
"Sie pfiffen darauf" - they would snap their fingers at it. The
British press flared up at once, and the next month witnessed a
conflagration to which the editors and diplomats on "both sides were
contributing fuel, -"-he i.ondon 'I'imes for January 21 contained the
following report of an interpellation in the Jaouse of Commons:
Mr , orman asljied the under- Secretary for Ji'oreign -^i-ffairs
whether any communication proposing or concerning joint or collectivi
action by iiuropean ^^tates, in view of the outbreak or expected
outbreak of the late war between the united btates and Spain, was
received from the Austrian or any other Government; and if so, vhat
was the nature of the reply of her Majesty's Government.
Viscount Cranborne ; Bo such communication as is suggested in
the question was made after the outbreak of the war between the
United S*fcates and Spain, but immediately before the war several
communications were received from other x'owers suggesting the
presentation of a joint note to the President of the united States.
Her Majesty's Government agreed to join with other Powers in a
note expressing a hope that furtlier negotiations might lead to a
peaceful settlement accompanied by guarantees for the establish-
ment of order in Cuba. But they first took steps to ascertain
that the presentation of such a note, as well as its terms, would
be acceptable to the ir-resident. Her Majesty's Government declined,
however, to associate themselves with other subsequent proposals
which seemed to them open to objection as having the appearance of
putting pressure on the Government of the United States and offer-
ing an opinion as to their attitude, i am not able to lay on the ta-
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tie any pa^jers on this subject.
But the German papers were not thus to he silenced, and
maintained the original statement that -Ljord panncefote had pro-
posed to embarrass the American Government. The iJerliner i^eueste
I^achricthen naively added that this declaration should be accepted,
and German officials spared from having to make the documents
public. The Ereuz Zeitung stated that the -^ope had urged Germany
or the Triple Alliance to intervene, but had been refused.
Again the Times (February 12) reported an interpellation on
the subject in tne iiouse of uommons;
Mr. Uorman ; asked the Under-Secretary of ^tate for
Foreign affairs whether ^eat Britain, through her Ambassadors,
ever proposed a joint note in which the Powers should declare
that Europe did not regard the armed intervention of the United
States in Cuba as justifiable, and whether, in consequence of the
refusal of Germany, this step was abandoned; and whether he could
make any further statement upon the subject.
V iscount Cranborne ( ) IJo. Great Jriritain never proposed
through her Majesty's Ambassadors or otherwise any declarations
adverse to the United States in regard to their intervention in
Cuba. (Hear, hear) On the contrary, her majesty's Government
declined to assent to any such proposal, i Cheers^
But the German press was evidently sure of its ground, for
it did not retract a word, and on -^'ebruary 12, the imperial Gazette
published, in order to clarify matters, it explained, the text of
the message the German -embassador von Holleben had sent on this
subject to ^ount von i^ulow, the -i-mperial *^hancellor. ihe argument
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ran as follows: '^he iiritish -Embassador had initiated an attempt to
send a new note after the final concession of an armistice by
Spain, perhaps on account of representations made to Queen victoria
by the Spanish Queen n.egent to the effect that although the atti-
tude of *^ongress made peace doubtful, the -^resident had advocated
American intervention only if such action would be justified by
the v;orld at large; hence a new note might with propriety be sent.
If an identical note came from each power, the one which took the
initiative would be cleared of blame, "Personally", Dr. von iLolleben
added, "I have not much sympathy with the idea of a declaration
of that kind," to which the ICaiser had added the marginal note, "I
consider that this would be altogether a mistake, futile, and
therefore mischievous •••• I am against this." The press added that
Prince iienry would personally lay the documents in the case before
President Roosevelt, to show him what European -fewer was really
friendly toward -America in 1898. HMt it scarcely need be added
that the American (xovernment made it clear by its attitude that
the visit of JrTince -o-enry would not be allowed to acquire any
diplomatic significance.
I'he London 'J-imes (JPebruary 15 i pointed out three errors
on the part of ivir. von Holleben: the statement that ^-ord Pauncefote
had taken the initiative in proposing a Joint note; the statement
that the other five representatives telegraphed their home
governments "at the request of the British -Embassador"; and finally
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by sending the l*'oreign Office what he said was the text of a
despatch prepared by ^ord Pauncefote, while in fact it was written
by the l^rench Ambassador from notes taken down b,/ Lord Pauncefote.
The facts seem to have been that, owing to the strong dynastic ties
between the courts at ^viadrid and Vienna, Dr. von Hengelmllller , the
Minister from Austria-mmgary , had been instructed unofficially to
propose such a joint note. As the Dean of the diplomatic carps.
Lord Pauncefote had, on this request, invited and presidea over
such a conference at the uritish -Embassy, iie had then submitted
the proposed draft to the Deparmtnet of ^^tate, and on receiving the
assent of the '^erican ^'ovemment , had stood firmly against any
proposed alterations. And similarly when a second note was
proposed in view of the eleventh hour proposal of the Spanish
CJovernment to grant an armistice, and the strong words "would not
be justified" had been suggested, the Jbritish Ambassador was
again acting only as i^ean of the ^arps. ^'he later note was never
presented. I'hat the jiritish «fovemment had taken a course calcu-
lated to tie the President's hands was belied not only by the
statements of Lord Cranborne, the ^nder-Secretary for Ji'oreign
Affairs, but by the repeated assurances of good will before and
during the war, to which lir. Hay had frequently borne testimony.
And as to i^ord Pauncefote 's personal attitude toward the American
people, the universal respect in which he was held by official
circles in V/ashington spoke for itself. I'he press attack upon that
gentleman was particularly regrettable because his position and
training prevented a reply which might have set false reports
at rest. Mr. Wayne :.iac veagh. Ambassador to italy and former
-86-

Attorney General, sent a letter to the -American press in which he
spoke in high terms of Lord pauncefote. -^nd (general i?'08ter,
former Secretary of ^tate and long an intimate friend of the am-
bassador, wrote to the i/^ashington -^ost that any charges against
that gentleman were certainly unfounded, and that "idle rumors or
surmises of misinformed persons should not be permitted to cloud
10
the reputation of such a distinguished diplomatist."
The outcome of this episode was scarcely a pleasing contri-
bution to the visit of Prince nenry. It did, however, demonstrate
certain truths, it made it evident how high a value iiiuropean
nations had come to set on the friendship of the new world power.
And it made the i;^erman diploma-te concerned appear to put it chari-
tably, rather amateur. I'o begin a press campaign on the strength
of a mista]j:en report, and be defeated at their own game after having
called on the world to witness, was a faux pas their imperial
master would be slow to forgive.
2. The xjBnila j:>ay -Cipisode.
A reason which had made the foreign office all the more
anxious to precipitate such a controversy was the decidedly un-
favorable impression which the actions of the German squadron at
ivianila in 1898 had aroused in -America. Numerous versions of the
story were published from time to time. Hiit the final word came
later. In 1913 Admiral i^ewey published his autobiography, wherein
10. Ji'oster: i^iplomatic memoirs II p. 317, et sec[.
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lie told very plainly what had occurred at --lanila between himself
and the uerman admiral, von Jjiederichs. »^hen the booic reached
Germany it evoked questions in the Keichstag, while ^ount Steven tlow
issued a vigorous denial. '^''^ Later -Admiral von Liederichs contri-
buted a long article to the ^mrine Kundschau, giving his version
of the episode. ne denied any culpabibity, and wrote with an
air of injured innocence, ueside these statenents by the two
admirals immediately concerned, numerous references to the epi-
sode have appeared from time to ti.ie. I'hese have frequently been
15
higlily colored, and too chauvinistic to be reliable.
I A thorough discussion of the points of law and fact involved
in the Manila jsay affair would expand to undue proportions, iiowever,
a few importajit points may be considered critically, jj-irst, to ac-
count for the fact that the vxerman squadron at i-ianila was stronger
for a time than even that of Admiral
-^ewey. ^his is one of the
most labored points in Admiral von Diederichs' reply, it appears
that the transport Darmstadt was expected at Mao Chau, where the
11. Dee i^ew lork '•imes of jjebruary, 18, 19M.
12. A Statement of -Civents in Manila, May-Oct. 1898, translated
from the Marine x<undschau and reprinted in the Journal of the
Kojal United iierviee Institution, 50:4El-46, i^ov. 1914.
13. Thus the Spectator (90:167) prints a report of an after-dinner
speech wherein. Lewey was credited with saying that if the
±iritish ships should act in concert with the ^xerman, "the lis:
was up." . d &
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German Asiatic Fleet was to rendez_vous while supplies were ta^cen
on and the sick and those about to be discharged were transferred
to the Darmstadt for return to Germany, ij'ourteen hundred men were
brought as relief. -L'he outbreak of the war with iSpain made it
necessary to send two uemian vessels to Manila to protect uerman
interests there, and then, the admiral was ordered to the scene,
and thus had to take a third ship. 'I'his interferred with his plans
to such an extent that he had the other vessels of the squadron
come to rianila and effect the transfer of men and stores there.
At a time when rumors of German intervention were rife, it is
scarcely to be wondered that Admiral i^ewey inquired the reason
for the presence of so large a force. J-lie reply of the uerman
admiral was "I am here by order of the i^iser, sir."^"^ Admiral
Dewey got the impression that his question was not altogether wel-
come. Admiral von Diederichs explains, however, that he used merely
a customary expression to show that his presence was not due to
any desire on his part to embarrass the American squadron, but to
orders from higher authority. And indeed it need not be thought
that the presence of the German admiral and his entire squadron
was due to any personal wish in the matter-, whatever he said and
did was pursuant to orders, for no tierman officer would have dared
to incur the consequences of tailing action of such international
importance without being sure of his ground. The excuse, however,
that Manila Bay was selected as the best rendezvous for his squadron
under the circumstances seems trivial, i^aval officers will con-
14. Dewey: Autobiography, p. 257.
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concede that a blockaded port is the laat place in which to effect
a transfer of men and property hy a neutral squadron, lwt could
the presence of so large a force he excused on the grounds of pro-
tection to commercial interests; for in 1896, Germany raniied sixth
in amount of imports and fourth in exports. »'hile the ijritish force
was never greater than three ships to protect interests several
times as great as those of* Germany. "^^
But the mere presence of the men-of-war was less disconcerting
to -a-dmiral i^ewey than their actions, ueutral warships are frequent-
ly permitted to enter bloc^kaded ports, but their status is clearly
that of a guest; the commander of the blockading force is privileged
16
to exclude them. ^nd it follows by inference that while in the
blockaded harbor neutral men-of-war are obliged by the situation to
conform to the wishes of the blockade commander, -out -ti-dmiral von
Diederichs did not subscribe to this view, for he writes: "The
belligerents blockaders and blockaded, have the right in any ef-
fective blockade to stop any traffic within the blockaded zone,
and also to turn back war vessels, even by force. i3ut,if a
neutral warship is admitted within the zone, then the belligerents
have no more authority over this ship than during peace; but an
effective blockade can at any time be again established." If this
15. See -ijondon -times, June E8 , 1698.
16. ?or expression of the rights of neutral warships in blockaded
harbors, bearing out Admiral -t^ewey's views, see Walker: The
Science of international i-aw
, pp. 522-4; Lawrence: principles of
Interna oional Law, p. 688; ±ienton: International Law and Diplo-
macy in the Spanish—^^-meri can V'/ar
, p. 217; ualyo; i,e Droit In-
ternational 5:108, section 2834; Perels , sometime lecturer at
the imperial uaval -^cademy at x^iel: x^ianuel de Droit iviaritime
International, p. 293,
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view were general there would be very few neutral warships admitted
to blockaded ports, """nd curiously enough, the German admiral
writes as if a blockade were a sort of cooperative affair in which
the blockaded party had some authority over the blockade!
Admiral von Diederichs quotes I'ewey's blockade proclamation
to the liovernor *^eneral in iianila, A blockade of this port
will be at once established and finds it inadequate in that
it fails to define the limits, time of commencement, or period of
truce for neutral ships to leave, let the limits are clearly ex-
pressed in the word "port", the time is "at once", and the third
point is covered by international law. xhe objection is also
raised that a cop,/ of the proclamation was not delivered to the
German consul by the American commander; but this is the duty of the
authorities of the port, not of the officer imposing the blockade,
17
who could communicate with the land only under flag of truce.
When warships of other nations entered the port they reported
to the commander-in-chief and asked where to anchor. The ^ierman
ships, however, steamed in without formality and dropped anchor
where they chose. Admiral -^^ewey resented this, and on one occasion
had a shot fired across the bows of the Cormoran, when, on coming
into the harbor one night for the first time, she had failed to
19
respond to the hail of the steam launch sent to board her.
There follov/ed after several such events a correspondence in which
17. Lawrence, p. 688
18. Dewey, p. 254.
19. Ji'or statement of the commander of the ^erman "^hip, see i^.Y.
Tribune, ^^^arch 5, 1914.
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Admiral Dewey expressed the necessity of having the identity of
each vessel entering the bay determined, probably by sending an
officer on board. It wiDl be remembered that at the time a second
Spanish fleet, stronger than that of Dewey, was on the way from
dpainj hence it would have been criminal negligence to have been
in the slightest degree careless about identifying in-coming men-
of-war, especially at night.
Admiral von Diederichs, on the other hand, professed to
believe that the American admiral claimed the "droit de visite",
which would include even the examination of the ship's papers -
' a proceedure no naval officer would tolerate. J-'ev/ey promptly
disclaimed any such demand, but again asserted the necessity of
sending a boarding officer, which might easily be for the purpose
of designating an anchorage out of the blookaders' proposed line
of attack, k/hile agreeing that a i:5panish warship might easily
enter the bay under the ^^erman flag to deceive the enemy, the
l;^erman admiral held that this would be regrettable for the defend-
ers, but did not give any justification for the visit of an offi-
cer. The assertion that, once admitted, a neutral warship was
under no obligation to the blockade commander, might be carried
to the most ridiculous extremes.
While -admiral -i-'ewey made no alliance with Aguinaldo it was
his policy to allow the insurgent forces a free hand in fighting
the Spaniards, un «^uly 6, it was reported that the merman cruiser
Irene had interfered with insurgent operations against the Spanish
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forces on Isla urande. I'wo sliips were sent to investigate, and
found the report to be correct. On their approach the irene had
moved away. Admiral von Uieaerichs denies any such unneutral
action, and explains that the J-rene had been sent to find a uerrnan
subject whom the consul in uianila had missed, and to find a suit-
able place in which to lie during the monsoons.
When the -oattiraore and Charleston steamed into ivianila Bay
convoying the first Army -Uetachraent, the greater part of the
German fleet was anchored at the entrance. Un the approach of the
American ships they got undsi^vay and formed column at a few hundred
yards, with guns and field glasses apparently turned on the Amer-
icans, .i'he American ships went to general quarters at once and
prepared for action, and thus they steamed up the bay until the
German squadron sheered off and anchored across the harbor. J-his
is only an example typical of the relations between the two
squadrons.
An officer who heard the conversation vouches for the
oft-repeated story of Admiral -^^ewey's stormy conversation with the
German flag- lieutenant
,
ending with the tljreat that "you may
tell Admiral von Diederichs that if he wants a fight i will be
ready for him in half an hour". Admiral Dewey writes that after
this"there was no further interference with the blockade or breach
of etiquette which had been established by the common consent
20. J'iske: '"ar ••ime in i^ianila, p. 108.
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of the other foreign coiumanders.
"
Much has been written in England and -'i-raerica of the support
which the isritish commander, '^aptain '^ir -^^dward uhicester of the
M.M.ii. immortalite, gave to the -^^merioan admiral, uewey writes of
this as a fitting sequel to the "blood is thicker than water" inci-
dent in 1869, when the -American j?'lag- officer Tatnall went to the
assistance of jiritish forces being destroyed by the Chinese forts
22
on the Pei J^iver. ViThile the ijritish and American commanders were
on particularly intimate terms during the days of the blockade, the
most spectacular demonstration of an understanding was given when
the naval and land forces made the almost bloodless attack on the
oity of i'lanila on August 13. un August 9, the foreign men-of-war
and refugee steamers had been warned to take up positions out of
the proposed zone of hostilities, it happened that while the
i^ritish and Japanese moved over to uavite, the base of the American
Squadron, the jYench and ^^erman vessels anchored north of the
Uity - the direction of attack. On the 10th they closed to within
a mile of the breakwater at the mouth of the i'asig itiver, and
opposite the center of the ^ity. nere they remained until uanila
fell. This move seemed to menace Admiral i^ewey's freedom
of action, when the -American squadron got under way to bombard
the city, the guard on the ±Jritish immortalite was paraded while
uewey 's favorite march was played, i-hen the -^ritish ships moved
21. Dewey, p. 267
2^. Ibid, p. 31
23. Ibid, p. 276.
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across the "bay and took up a position between the foreign men-of-
war and Dewey's squadron."" xhe bombardment proved to be a farce,
for the commander at Manila merely wished to save ^punish hOi..or
by a brief demonstration of resistance.
There is room for speculation as to the reason for the Uerraan
attitude at Manila, i^o naval officer - least of all in the imper-
ial ^ierman Wavy - would have dared to act so irreguD^arly without
instructions from the home government, ^nd if, as Admiral von
Diederichs professes, the series of unpleasant occurrences at
Manila were the result of a chain of peculiar circumstances and
the work of busy-bodies who cixculated malicious reports, it is
difficult to reconcile the fact that when the German flagship left
liagasaki for Manila it was commonly reported that the Germans would
try to raise the blockade, and this rumor was not denied. And it
is difficult, too, to reconcile the admiral's version of v^erman
aims in the Philippines with the view of the (German press that the
fall of Spanish power would be a signal for a "nev/ grouping of inter-
ests", as the Deutsche Zeitung expressed it.
The view of a close observer of ^eriiaan diplomacy is that
the Foreign Office was pursuing a policy which might be character-
24. Dewey, p. 277. See also statement of ^^ir Edw. Chichester,
son of the captain at -^lanila, luY. Times, Mar. 4, 1914. He
confirms the story that "Captain Chiehester replied, when asked
by von Diederichs what he would do in case the German squad-
ron intervened, that it was "a secret known only to Admiral
Dewey and myself."
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ized as "tertius gaudens" or "tertius expectans" at Manila, eager
25
to pick up any bone that might fall from the two contestants.
Then it must be remembered that this was the time when a large
navy was being urged so vehemently in ixermany. -^he presence of
a German squadron at Manila was pregnant with suggestions of
new acquisitions in the urient, and gave the navy an excellent ad-
vertisement. The international concern over the presence of the
squadron was a gratifying admission of German imperial power. And
the Kaiser doubtless felt that his prestige abroad was enhanced
by occasionally assuming some striking pose, ne is said to have
remarked: "If I had had a larger fleet I would have taken uncle
26
Sam by the scruff of his neck". He expressai the same idea
when he said (July 5, 1900); "The ocean bears witness that, even
in the distance and on its further side, without Germany and the
27
German •C'mperor no great decision dare be taken."
nix. Hay's letters from London contribute to the diplomatic
side of the question of vxerman aims in the Philippines. On
July 14 he wrote that the German Ambassador had sought an inter-
view. "What he said, as you will see, amounted to this: the German
Government are most anxious that we shall be convinced of the
friendliness of their attitude and intentions; they also want us
to understand that they wish a few coaling-stations in the Pacific
that they think we may give them; they would like a free hand in
25. O.Eltzbacher, i.e. J.j^llis -^arker , Kinettenth Century, 62:194
Aug. 1902.
26. I'isll: Path of Ji^mpire
,
p. 125; Thayer: -^ife of John Hay, II,
p. 279.
27. bmith: Militarism and iitatecraft, p. 34.
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i3a:noa at the samo time I judge from what Hatzfeldt said, as well as
what Lascolles, tne British A;iilDassador in Berlin, told me, that
whatever v/e do or refuse to do, so that our action and our words
are pitched in diplomatic tones, - noz pulling any affront on them
which they shall he forced to teJce up, - they will not quarrel with
28
us. They cannot afford to force a c[uarrel upon us" And on
Aug-ust 2, he writes: "I have no doubt that Germany has been
intriguing both with Aguinaldo and Soain. Thoy are most anxious to
get a foothold there; but if they do it there v/ill be danger of
29
grave complication v/ith other European powers." Dr. Talcott
Williams has recently written on the authority of the late Charles
E. Smith, :postmaster General, under Mr. McKinley, that a personal
letter from Lord Salisbury to the President warned him that, if
the Philippines v/ere not acquired by tne United States, Germcjiy
30
would seize them and a general war would follow. While from
I.Ir. Hay's correspondence it is quite probable that some such mes-
sage was sent verbally, it seems likely that Mr. Smith misunder-
stood. For Mr. i^ay, the one most apt to be informed of such
a letter, and other members of the cabinet are not aware or its
existence, nor does Olcott's Life of William MoKinlsy refer to
such correspondence.
Another reason sometl-aes assigned as the cause oi German
28. Olcott, II p. 155 et seq.
29. ibid. p. 13d, et seq.
30. Talcott Williams in World's work, 56:168; quoted in Latane:
Prom Isolation to Leadership, p. 85.
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131. Mr. Whitman, formerly a correspondent in Berlin, in Things I
Rememher, p. V8 et seq. , states that he heard this on good
authority.' Mr. J^'isii in Path ox iJim'Qire p. 12y and LIr. Thayer
in John Hay II, p. 280, accredit these vDrds to "an American
official"
.
22. Reference in this connection is frequently made to the 7/ash-
ington Post of A^ril 17,1907, stating that certain remarks
of Dr. White were therein orinted. The editor of that paper,
however, refers to the issue of the preceding day, in v/nich
the Post quoted the H. Y.Staats-Zeitung, which in turn quotes
Dr. Wiiite "on July 4, 1899, at Leipzig" as saying that the
German aovermient "have never disclosed the authoritative
suggestion made to them that we did not vmnt the Philippines,
but would be glad to have them taKie them". TheStaats-Zeitung
is unable to find v/here it made the sta"cement, but writes
that it "is undoubtedly authentic and in accordance with
the series of statements which the Ambassador made."
Prof. Burr, custodian of Dr. V/hite's oapers, has been
good enough to examine the manuscript of the speech of July
A 1899. It was not delivered at Leipzig, but at the Inter-
national Peace GonJference, and contained no mention of the
^hilio-oines. On July 4, 1698 and 1900, Dr. »Vhite spo^e at
LeiTDzig. On the form.er occasion he did not mention the
Phiii-oTDines. On the latter he said: "I feel certam ....^that
had Ivlr^. licKinley nauled down the American flag in uuba, in
the -'hiliiDpines, and in Porto Kico, - had he lef . tneir
popu-
lations to anarchy and endless internecine war; had ne left
them in the hands of their old r^olers, or aeserted them and
left them to tne .ender mercies of any other great power
ambitious to extend its dominions, these very men wno nowuxuxu o
A-nri a usurper would have denounceddenounce mm as a tyrt-nt a a b x vvw j.u. ±a«.»v^
him as a traitor and a coward." o.i-KnAr>t -i-rnm a
ii-inally, in reply to a question on
^^^f ^.^^^^V
correspondent of the Sun, LIr. ./nite sent
^^^/^
complete denial of ever having uttered ^"^^^ suggestion
that
German acquisition of the Philippines would oe toler=.oed.
11. Y. Times, Feb. 28, 1914
—yb—
aspirations in the Philippine is tiie alleged fact that the A;;iori-
can Ambassador, Dr. Andrew D. ^faito, said: "V/o don't want the
Philippines; wliy don't you t&lza them?"'^-'- This statement has
never been substantiated. Hot only did Dr. V/hite deny any such
speech, but it is incongruous with the viev;s expressed in his
writings and addresses, v^liich are now carefully i^reserved at
Itliaca, New York.*" It v>^ould seem not only charitable but merely
just to lay this libel to rest. I
Ho record of the Ilanila Bay episode would be complete without

a passing reference to Caotain Goghlan and the "Minesolf und
Gott" song. In 1899, wlien a number of naval oificers returned
from the ±*hilippines, they wore tendered a banquet in now ^oric.
Toward the last ot the evening Gaotain Goghlan sang a selection
wherein the American squadron at Manila had paid their respects
to tne Kaiser and tne Iraioeriul Navy. The song v/as extremely a
propos, and was printed throughout the country. Both Mr. Es^ and
LIr. McKinley expressed to the G-erman -^mhassador their regrets
that thefcaptain should have committed such an indescretion. But
the song was apparently a case oi the truth tnat hurt, and is said
33
to have been keenly lelt by his Imperial Liajesty.
An interesting sequel to German activity in the r'hilippines
was tne ourchase in lb99 of the Garoline aM Ivlarianne Island
groups in the Pacific. The Imperial uhancellor, von Bulow, tells
the story in nis book on Imperial Germany. "The end of the Span-
ish - American War in l«9y gave us zhe opportunity to acquire tne
Caroline and Llarianne Islands, and thus win a point of support
in Polynesia. A year later we succeeded in cringing to an end the
long quarrel over Samoa by a settlement with iiinglaiid and America
that was to our advantage. Both acquisitions .... had been the
subject Of diplomatic eiforts lasting for many years and -oing
back to tne very beginning or our uolonial policy ... Our friendly
relations with theSpanish nation found expression in the under-
34 • • -i-
standing regarding the Caroline Islands " i;'rom tms inter-
esting admission it can scarcely be doubted tnat the prospect oi
33. von Schiercrand: The Kaiser's Speeches, p. llo et seq.
34. von Bulow: Imperial Germany, p.lly et seq. These islanas
nad
been desired by i^ormany in j^ismarck' s time. See hender.on.
Short history of Germany, End ^d. II p. ^rc; i!'or.Kel.l88b
,
p. 333; London Times, iJ'eb. 15,1902.
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acquiring those islands, alon^:; with tho "tortius oxpoctans" policy
and the "blundering seli-assertiveness which was coming to character-
ize the Grornan Imperial policy, go lar toward explaining the German
attitude tavard America m lb9b.
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VI.
TilE OPiJiN DOOR AND THii: BOXliR REBELLION
1. Europe in uhina - xiia ^irowing Importanco oi zno Orient.
In discussing tiio stand I.Ir. Hay took on Ohinose territorial
integrity, I.Ir. Thayer writes: "After the Japanese had deieated
the Chinese in 1894, China lay like a stranded wnale apparently
dead or dying, and the chief Powers oi iiiurope came, like xisnermen
after olubDer, and took nere a province and tnere a harbor, and
were callous to the lact tmt their victim was not dead."-*- There
is no brighter page in the history ot American diplomacy th£.n the
story of tne attitude of tno United ijtates G^overnment toward
China in her days oi distress. And the statement and execution
of tills policy in -ens face oi opposition by the powers and the
press were the work ox Jonn Hay. -
On September b, 1899, LIr. Hay senti letters to tne American
diplomatic representatives at tiie capitals of tne various powers
claiming spheres oi influence m China, xhose notes expressed
the desire of the United States b^overnment tnat tne various
nations:
First. Will in no way interfere with any treaty port or
any vest interest v/itnin any so-called sphere of interest" or
leased territory it may nave in china.
Second. T-at tne uiiinese treaty tariff of the time being
snail apply to all mercnandise landed or sm-pped to all such
1. Thayer: Life of Jonn nay, II, p. 240.
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ports as are within SL.id "sphere of inturGSi:" I unless tnoy be
"free -jorts"), no matter to what nationality it may Dolong, and
that duties so leviable sncill be collected oy the uhinose vxovom-
ment.
Third. That it vd 11 levy no nignor naroor dues on vessels
of another nationality irequenting any port in suoh "s;)here" than
snail be levied on vessels of its own nationality, and no higher
railroad cnarges over lines tuilt, controlled, or operated v/itnin
its "sphere" on merchandise belonging to citizens or subjects oe
otner nationalities transported thro^ugh sucn "s-here" tnan
sh 11 oe levied on similar merchc..ndise belonging to its own
E
nationals transported over equal distances. Acquiescence by
each power was requested, subject to tne agreement oi tne others.
Lord Salisbury ?/as the first to reply, on x^ovember 20,1899.
uount von jstilow agreed orally on i^ecember 4, and in writing on
ij-ebruary 19, 1900. xhe x>rencii, xiussian, -Japanese, and Italian
liovernments acceded in tiiat order, m tne case of Russia at
least, it seems tnat tne agreement w::s given with the expectation
3
that failure would oe met a'G some otner capital. isut on ilarcn
20, 1900, Itr. nay addressed identical notes to each of tne
governments, enclosing copies of tne notes irora all tne pov/ers,
and ST^ating tnat tne American government v/ould ''tnereiore consider
the assent given to it oy tne as xinal and definitive".
Thus LIT. nay led the way to tne establishment oi the open door
in
2rrorrKeiy"lb99rpp. 126-4ti3. gives .i.e correspondence with the
several goverinnents.
3. Thayer, II p. E43.
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China, Uliou./n it was suraly a solf-donyirit^ ordinanco to v/hicii tho
various powers would liave "boen slow to sabscrite on thoir own
initiative.
2, Joint Intorvention in tho Boxer RebGllion.
'i'ha seizure of Ziao 'Jiiau in 1897 and tho lease of the
Shantung Peninsula for ninety nine years v/as tho -enalty the
German Government imposed for the murder of t-z/o missionaries in
iJhina. Though tl^ deed demanded reparation as suitable as possi-
ble, this excessive demand placed, it was remarked, the highest
4
quotation yet laiovm on two missionaries. This particular murder
was only oneof a number oi hostile and cruel acts by members of
a Chinese society popularly knovm as lioxers.acts which culminated in
the murder of the (merman Minister at Peking, and the outbreak of
a terrible rebellion which kept the forei.^iers in the capital
besieged within the Jiritish Legation for over a mouth. A general
massacre v/as narrowly averted. The various powers rushed troops
to the rescue, and larger detachments were sent to occupy rebel-
lious districts and restore order. To command the joint forces
4. In his Imperial Gsrman^ (p.llVj von Bulow speaks of thJ.s as
"one of the most significant actions of Liodern b^aniian history
whJ.Gh secured for us a 'place in the sun* in the is'ar
^ast." iiismarck said that Kiao ^liau was "big enough for all
sorts of foolishness."
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"ffie uerman i>!arsiiaii von .miacrccc v/ac gg iccuoa r^T^rof^Tfm"^FT?W
the Kaisor indulgod in several flights of invective, in which ho
gavo such advice as: "S^are nobody, raalce no pri;-;onors. Use youx
weapons in a manner to make every L;hinaman for a tnousand years to
"5
oorae, forego the wish to as much as look askance at a lierraan.
On another occasion he "bade his troops to act as ruthlessly as the
Huns. Later, v;hen some German soidiers wrote of cruel excesses in
Jhina, their letters were printed under the heading "Letters from
the Huns."^
After a triumphal trip through ijermany to his port of embark-
ation. Count von v/aldersee arrived in China after Peking had been
occupied. There remaijied only police duty in various localities.
The relentlessness v; it h which the German troops carried out punitive
expeditions to different places made it appear that the Xaiser^s
advice had not fallen on stony ground. It seemed as thoagh
trouble was being stirred up in order to justify the presence of a
German field marshall. I'hus on jne occasion German troops were
so reckless as to drive av/ay and plunder a force of Chinese troops
who had been engaged in capturing Jjoxers. Then they opened a
jail and released a number of prisoners, ?/ho happened to be
5. von Schierbrand: The Kaiser's Speeches, p. 260. See also pp.£58-
9, E62.
6. Saunders: -Ouilder and iilunderer, p. 99; Olcott I{, p. 254.
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Boxers . On at hor occasions tie Goriaan troops, at no risk to
themselves, killed wantonly in retaliation for the murder of a
GrGrman citizen in the tov/n.
When, in i'ehruary 1901, it seemed that the Ohinese peace
commissioners v/ere "becoming dilatory. Count von .^/aliGraee declared
that "renewal of operations on a large scale may hecorae necessary".
All this was extremely repugnant to Anr; rican generals and to
humane people the world over. Several governments protested and
hostilities were not resu^aed. Using tha Kaiser's words as a re-
proach, the Ajnerican second-in-command, (xeneral Wilson, remarked
to count von //aldersee that some liiuropean troops acted more like
Huns than civilized soldiery, the truth ox v/hich -Oie Grerm-n Llarsliall
admitted.
S. After the Rebellion.
The rehellion had scarcely subsided before some of the powers
began to "feather their nests" in China. Kussia claimed a large
tri.ct in Tientsin by right of conquest. Uelgium laid claim to an
7, Read ^hina in convulsion, Chapter ZXIiVII,by A.n.bmith, for
an account of needless severity oracticed by the v^ormans.
They had acted in this way >rior to the outbreak of the re-
bellion - see j^'oreign Kelations, 1899, p. 168.
8. elements: The Boser Rebellion, p. lol.
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s-*! joining conoession. Ur. conger, the united btatos Minister,
wrote: " The several armies ca^ae here, l.s thoy have all declared,
for a general purpose, and not to gam any soocial advantage for
individual govermients. Tliis * grab ga^ne* , therefore, in which
9
they are indulging, is neither fair nor cousistont.
"
ivir. Hay was anxious for a prompt settlement and return to
nornal conditions, and in tlie attitude of uonaany and Kussia he
saw a constant incitement for the Chinese to again cause troahle.
On July 2, nr. Hay issued a note setting forth the American
attitude toward China; this was a bold but effective stroke in
checlcing .:;uropea,n ambitions. On October 16, 1900, he v/rote: "The
success we h:.id in stopping that first preposterous uerman movement
when the whole world seemed likely to join in it, when the entire
press of the continent and a great many on tliis side were in favor
of it, will alv/ays be a source of gratification ... The moment
we acted, the rest of the world paused, and finally came over to
our ground; and the German government ,which is generally brutal
but seldom silly, recovered its senses, climbed down off its perch,
and presented another proposition which v/as exactly in line 7ath
" 10
our position.
After tlie Chinese brovemment had appointed Li Hung Chang to
negotiate a settlement with the cowers, vo ik was delayed because
the Chinese commissioner had not full powers acceptable to the
9. i'oreign Kelations 1901, p. 40. ^v,^^-o«o
10. Thayer: i^ife of Jolm nay, II, p. ^46. .'or l^^lff^lf^"^^'
see ii'oreigTi i<elati:ns, 1900, p. 353, 286-8, 343-4,
354.
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Gerinan and othor govorrunonts. Aitor ho prosontod credontiale
whiGh v/ere in proper forrn, it oausod somo ambarr^ssraent whan, aftor
raaiine; such a point of the matter, only ono of the ooinmissioners
ith whom he was to treat v/as able, in turn, to show his full
powers.
Then on Septe.iber 18, the uennan char.^e at .Washington
presented a note v/herein it was said to be the decision of the
Ger;:ian iiinperor that as a preliminary to any negotiations he consider
ed it ex-pedient that the ministers at Peking be instructed to de-
signate the orinciiDal offenders, and that these be executed by the
11
pov/ers. TO this ^r, nill, the Assistant Secretary of State,
replied timt it v/as the view of his government that tlos trial and
punishment of the many offenders should be left to the Chinese
(jovernnent, imposing upon it b./ a provision of the treaty the
obligation of punishing in a commensurate degree the various
offenders, xie extressed the determination of his government to
enter into negotiations as promptly as possible. On October 2,
after the Chinese government made a move toward punishing the
gailty leaders, the liorman charge presented a new memorandum v/Mch
12
met the American position squarely. Thus the incident was closed
and instead of treating the Chinese ^iovernjiient as incompetent
to carry out pjistic e, • that government v/as obligated to do so even
though it carried tne death ;enalty to high places in the court.
Throughout the negotiations the American vrovemment stood
firm for justice to china ai^ the maintenance of the open door.
11. roreign Kelations, 1900, p. 341.
12. ibid. p.
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And though tho uprising had apparently sv/opt av/ay the good promisos
of the previous year, Mr. nay's diplomacy was at longth successful
in preventing furthor oartition of tho (J nine so coast. On i^overahor
:.l
,
1900, he wrote to nenry Adans: "V/hat a business this has "been
in (Jhina*. So far we have got on by being honest and naif - I d3
not clearly see v/here we are to come -ne delayed cropper? r>ut
it •••ill come. At least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with
liermany. 1 would rathor, i think, be the dupe of uhina, than the
chum of the Kaiser, have you noticed how the world will take any-
thing nowadays from a u-ermaoi? ±5ulow said yesterday in substance -
'We have demanded of '->hina everything v/e can think of. If we
think of anything else v/e will demand that, and be d...d to you' -
13
and not a man in the vrorld kicks."
A last diplomatic triumph for the United states in uhina came
v;hen, after signing a protocol in which tno indemnity was fixed in
harkev/an taels, a silver coin, at a specified rate of exchange for
each country. The value of the coin became debased, aid some
nations, notably Kussia and VTerr.iany,were unwilling to accept them
at the rate of exchange specified in the protocol. I'he united
14
States government took the opposite view, and carried its point.
Thus closed b-erman --'American relations in tnis quarter of the globe,
after clearly vindicating the wise and just diplomatic policy of
Mr. nay.
13. jj'oreign relations, -0.248. x'or another letter - xvir. nay to ^.'ir.
Adee, the second assistant becy. , see ulcott II p.E38.ne v/rites:
"if vve leave u-er-aany and .ii^igland in fekin^-, and retire vt: th
iiussia, who has unauest ionably made her bargain already m th
uhina, we will not 'only seem to have been beaten, but we run a
serious risk ofjbeing- really frozen out. . .^^ngland and Germany be-
ing left in i-^eking,^;rer:aany by super ico: brute selfishness will
have her way, and ?/e sndl be left out in tne cold."
14. von ^Dchierbrand: Ajaerica, Asia, and the pacific, p. 41.
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AIvIiiiRiCJA AS A WURLD PO'.YKR.
1. Kesults of the S -.anisJi-Ainerican war.
The A:nerican xvepuhlio amerged from the ./ar v/ith yoain as a
world power. The v/ar in itself was only one of a munher of causes
j
the products of A-uerican industry and agriculture had for so.ne years
constituted a serious economic prohlem in jiiuropean countries, and
commercial rivalry already existed. Then when the United States
suddenly abandoned her splendid isolation and hecarae established
in the -hilippines and V/est Indies, (iuain and Tutuila, and assuiied
a leadership in China, colonial nations took particular notice.
Thus, as we have seen, in 1902, the American people Y/ere privileged
to witness a controversy between the oress and diplomats of the
European pov/ers over the question of vdiich nation had been most
friendly to America, 'r/hile not unconscious of these universal
protestations of friendship, the United States government did not
evince any desire to be on terms of better understanding with one of
the powers at the d isadvaiitage of another.
Ji'or some time, however, the two great iiiglish-speajiing nations
had been growing nearer to one another. The Iinown friendliness
of the Jiritish Government during the recent war, manifested both
in London and at Uanila Bay, seemed almost to portend some closer
understanding, uoring the early years of the twentieth centuiy
frequent allusions were made to a proposed Anglo-American alliance;
no ii;uropean power could be oblivious to the advantage, economic
and naval, of the friendship of America in tLme of a great war.
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In iilngland I.Ir. Clia;iiborluin v/orkod for tho proposal, aitii tho on-
thiisiastic support of the iiritish vTeiss, JrJut whilo tho (xovorniaont
of the United States considered the friendsMp of i>rei..t Britain
invaluable, it could nevor justify itself in entering a ijuropean
alliance; thus I.Ir. Chant erlain ' s endeavors produced nothing tangi-
ble.
2. The Attitude of (Germany.
The Imperial German (Government was not trio last to realize the
1
significance of the grov/ing cordiality of Britain for America.
Nor v/as it unconscious of tne fact that \ieman diplomacy nad made
matters worse during the Spanish war and again in Samoa. It was
doubtless the Kaiser's policy to utilize his personal charm to
bridge over just such gaps in hrusqae German diplomacy. Thus the
;:iirperor' s public professions were freq[uently not in accord with
public opinion in liermany, for where the public and press were hos-
tile he must be particularly cordial.
l.Thus on Seotember 9,1899, ivlr. Hay wrote to henry V/hite; "Our
relations with Germany are perfectly civil and courteous. They
are acting badly aboj.t our meals and cannot nelp bullying and
swaggering. It is their nature we are on the best of
terms about Samoa; Sternberg backed up Tripp in ev er /thing. ..
.
The Em jeror is nervously anxious to be on good terms with us -
on his own ter:;:S, bien entendu. " Thayer II p. 220
£. von i3ulow writes I fcerica Germ-Jiy p. 4b] thc^t German -Ajnori can
relatioios v/ere clouded "by the ivay in i.^ich pc^rt of the lilnglish
and American Press had interpreted certain incidents which had.
occurred between our squadron and the American fleet off llanila,"
'and that this raisunderstc^ndin.:" reached its height in ^'ebriie-ry,
1899, so that it seemed desirable strongly to advocate prepar-
i.tions for a better understanding bet./ien the tv/o natioiis of
kindred race."
3. 0.i^ltzbacher,i.e. J.^llis i3arker , in nineteenth century and
After. 52:195, Aug. 1902.
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To the German raind the emigration of so many i^erraan subjects
to America was a regrettable loss, isritish subjects who migrated
from 'i'ngland had added dominions, an -i^mpire, and a continent to
the crown; German emigrants had merely become a part of that
great hodge-podge called America. Yet the situation seemed not
wholly without compensation; for with one-fifth of the American
population of German blood, would not the United states be parti-
cularly susceptible to influence from -oerlin? i-'his was a new
idea, jj'or years the uennan-Americans who returned to their native
land had been the objects of hatred and official persecution -
witness how large the communications on this subject bulk in the
correspondence of the J-'epartmen t of otate with the imperial for-
eign Office. I'he German-American who had emigrated, fl-efluently
to escape military service, and returned later to flash the
evidence of his* prosperity before his old schoolmates was persona
non grata in Germany, de stirred up envy rather than friendship.
The: the vituperations of the agrarian press had maligned America
and Americans, and created an adverse public opinion. This be-
came evident to tourists, who found that the German officials -
soldiers, railway employees, and other lunctionaries - were at no
pains to hide their contempt for citizens of the united States.^
4. For an aggravated case wliich led to a warm expression of resent-
ment by the ^tate Department, read the case of the arrest of
Louis Btem at Kissingen, -oavaria (Foreign relations, 1895,
pp. 454-88) lir» ^tern used resentful language to an officious
individual who proved to be a baron, whose official capacity
was that of assistant Badekommissar (literally, bath commission-
er J at a health resort. The judgment imposed for this serious
offence was two weeks imprisonment and a fine of 6C0 marks;
bail was set at 80,000 marks. See also Gerard; My rour lears
in uermany, p. 320 et seq.
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On the other hand, American tourists sometimes felt oalled upon to
discuss in public the Zaiser and the vjerman uovernnient in a manner
more candid than complimentary. i<'or various reasons, then, uermany
was the least friendly of jiuropean states.
Suddenly, however, in the -'Americans of uerraan origin who were
so shabbily treated in uermany, whose forefathers had emigrated
to escape oppression and even imprisonment, the uerman uovernment
found a strong bond of sympathy between the two countries. The
^^iser's generosity found numerous opportunities to cultivate
this discovery, i-'ecorations were presented to deserving uerman-
Americans; tierman colors were sent with the greetings of the
Emperor to organizations of former German soldiers; autograph
portraits of His imperial Majesty found their way to the halls of
various uermanistic societies. Exhibitions of books, paintings,
and medallions might also be secured through the graciousness of
the Kaiser. It was rather a task, hov/ever, to bring natives of
the smaller uerman Jatates to feel bound to the new j^mpire over
vjhich the ^^ing of Prussia presided. Historical incongruities oc-
casionally appeared, as when the uermanistic ;iOciety of America
unveiled a monument of uarl ^^churz, who had fled from uermany, and
at the same time received a portrait of the iiaiser from ^ount von
Bemstorif
.
The ii^aiser's crusade for better relations was aided by the
numerous merman-American organizations, -^or example, the ^erman-
istio Society of America, whose membership included such men as
J.Pierpont xdorgan
,
Joseph Pulitzer, August rseOmont, john Vv. ijurgess,
ijicholas ijiurray i^utler, Augustus -ousch, Seth Low, and james
Speyer, reported for the year 1910 over fifty lectin^es on iferman
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subjects, given by eleven speakers under the auspioes of the
society. It also maintained a chair in Deutsche Kulturgeachicte
in Columbia University. The German—t»-meri can press, headed by trie
Kew York Staats-Zeitung , labored faithfully for better relations.
An unusual bid for American friendship was made in 1902, when
the Emperor sent his brother, -frince Henry of Prussia, on a mission
to this country, ostensibly to be present at the christening of
a yacht constructed for the Emperor by an •"•merioan firm. President
Roosevelt's daughter was invited to chri stain the yacht. During his
tour Prince Henry was well received in i^ew York, v^ashington, 6t,
Louis, and Chicago. After his return to Germany he confessed that
he had not met many Americans except those of German descent. It
was doubtless with some misgivings that the Hohenzollern prince
came to this republic. But save for the undignified controversy
which the press had carried on just before his departure from vi-er-
aany, and one unkind speech in the iiouse of ^Representatives , all
went happily. The general effect of the visit upon the -t^merican
people was rather to satisfy their curiousity than to command
their awe.
The British proclaimed the visit an attempt to gain an ally,
or to injure Anglo-American friendship. HMt the event took no
such turn. Prince Henry announced that he was sent for the single
purpose of promoting friendly relations, to the newspaper men in
Hew York he said: "^ihould you be willing to grasp a proffered hand.
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you will find suoh a one on tlie other side of the Atlantic Ocean. "5
But when one of the most prominent of his hearers was in uermny
some time later, and called to pay his respects to the i-rince
,
he
overheard while in a waiting room the Prince speaidLng of hira in
insulting language. And when ushered into the presence of the
Prince he showed his resentment by immediately excusing himself.
German professions of friendship were frequently in the nature
of lip-worship - prompted by wisdom rather than genuine regard.
In the wake of Prince iienry's visit came a gift to the American
people from the Kaiser. On May 14, he telegraphed to President
Roosevelt
:
I am still under the strong impression which the brilliant
and cordial reception of my brother. Prince iienry, by the citizens
of the United ^^tates of America has made on me. In the speeches in
which he was welcomed, mention was made repeatedly of the fact
that my ancestor, '•'rederick the Great, consistently assumed a
friendly attitude towards the young •American -^^epublic at the time
of its formation, laying thereby the foundation for those amicable
relations which have ever since existed between the two countries.
The example thus furnished me by the great i^ing I will follow. I
should like to perpetuate the memory of the visit of Prince Henry
by a gift to the American people, which I beg you will accept
in their name. I intend to present the United iStates with a bronze
statute of JVederic;k the ^reat, which might be erected in Washing-
s'
ton in a spot which I leave it to you to select. May this gift be
looked upon as a permanent token of the intimate relations which
5. London Times, Jj'eb. 28, 1902.
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,
our two great nations have so successfully nursed and developed.
The fact that the statute of -Frederick: the ixreat put in its
appearance just at the time when the Rochambeau ..lission from
France was in this country was not altogether fortunate, and it
was remarked in some quarters that after Prince henry's cordial
reception the Eaiser wished to spoil the Ji'rench visit. It was
also announced that some three hundred Americans who had shown
attention to the Hohenzollern prince were to he awarded decorations
7
or other mementoes from the Emperor. In coraraemoration of the
gift of a statue of the ilaiser's warlike ancestor, an act was
passed hy "^ongress to tender a statue of General ^iteuhen to the
German iiimperor and people.
Still another evidence of the imperial good will was the
proposal to exchange professors "between German and American uni-
versities, in the year 1905-6 iiarvard availed itself of the
Emperor's offer, and the next year Golumhia also sent and received
a professor. The Kaiser gave to the ^eruB-n Museum at Cambridge
a valuable collection illustrative of irernian culture and develop-
ment. There seemed to be no limit to the Kaiser's good will.
It may be said to the credit of the American people that
while these evidences of a desire for better relations v/ere gra-
tifying, the attentions of the Kaiser were received very casually;
the average citizen was interested but not greatly impressed when
Miss Roosevelt christened the yacht Meteor; and a royal prince
6. von Schierbrand: 'i'he Kaiser's Speeches, p. 119, et seq.
7. i'oster: The Practice of Diplomacy, p. 152.
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was after all only a ourious sort of creature.
3, The iJ^irst Hague Conference.
iVhen ^Libassador ("/hite went from -tJerlin to The Hague to be the
Americaji first delegate at the ±'eace Conference of 1899, he had the
assurance of Count von Biilow, then J^'oreign »=>ecretary, that the ^^er-
man delegates would act in accord with those from the united Jitates.
But the promised support was not realized, and on May 26 it seemed
that an impasse had been reached. On that day Lord Pauncefote,
for the Jjritish delegation, proposed a plan for a permanent court
9
of arbitration. Proposals on the same subject were made by the
Russian and American delegations also. The Russian scheme was
rather general in teriiis. Both delegations agreed to favor the
British plan in general, in order to facilitate the adoption of
the idea in some form. The Stench and Belgian delegations expres-
sed themselves as favoring the proposal, and the plan for a per-
manent tribunal seemed well launched when -i^ofessor Ziorn of the
German delegation rose to address the conference. He recognized
the desirability of such a court, and looked forv/ard to the day of
universal peace, -but at this time it was impractical; greater
preliminary experience was needed; occasional tribunals in special
cases would give an opportunity to judge better the desirability
of a permanent court; in short, the German Government was not
in favor of the proposed action.
8, '/Vhite: Autobiography, II, p. 259.
9. Holls: The Peace 'Conference at the Hague, p. 234 et seq»
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In reply, Count i<igra of Italy delivered an eloquent appeal
in which heldwelt upon the disappointment which would ensue in all
civilized nations if the conference "returned a cm t non posaumus
to the proposal." Other delegates urged the arbitral court,
and finally Dr. iiolls of the American delegation made an appeal
to the German delegate, in which he pointed out the effect which
such a refusal would have upon public opinion, and recalled the
futility of good resolutions if no concrete, permanent result was
achieved.
It was quite possible to constitute a permanent tribunal
without the acquiescence of Germany - but what would be the securi-
ty in such a pact if some of the powers were not represented? And
here was a threatening aspect of the situation, not only had the
German Jimperor instructed his own delegates to work against a per-
manent court, but it soon became evident that he was influencing
his neighbors and allies - Austria, Italy, Turicey, and Roumania -
10
to follow his example. I'his was a disappointment to *-*ount
i^igra of Italy, who had at first argued so strcngly for a permanent
court. Even the German delegates, except ^ount Miinster, were
loath to carry out the imperial orders. In a private conversation
with -^r. ^"hite, Count funster urged that arbitration was necessar-
ily injurious to Germany, because of her superior preparedness; any
postponement would aid her enemies. The conference seemed to have
struck a r'odfc.
'i'hat the obstruction was at last removed was in a large measure
10. White: Autobiography II p. 294, 500,5 01, 314.

due to the influence of i>r. k-hite. lie realized that whatever might
be the ±jnperor's view on arbitration as a oheolc on hia sovereign
power and a disadvantage to Germany, he would hesitate to incur
the obloguy whioh a refusal would entail, and would be loath to
allow iJ'ranoe and the Tsar to reap commendation at his expense. On
his own responsibility, and against the advice of his colleagues,
Pr. i/iHiite v/rote candidly to uount von ^lilow and pointed out some
of the results which would follow if tlie Kaiser did not relent
He represented that a minister who would permit his sovereign to
be put in so unhappy a position would be negligent. This letter
he sent to x>erlin by ^r. noils. Dr. ^orn of the lierman delegation
was sent at the same time by ^ount Miinster. The effort was suc-
cessful, for at a later meeting Dr. -^orn announced that his govern-
ment cordially adhered to the permanent tribunal and "fully acknow-
ledged the importance and grandeur of the new institution."^^ Thus
in 1899 "American diplomacy was triumphant for right in Europe as
well as in Asia.
11. V/hite; Autobiography II, p. 309,et se . Mr. white added an
interesting postscript; "Think how easily, if some such tri-bunal existed, your government and mine could refer to it the
whole mass of minor questions which our respective parliamen-
tary bodies have got control of, and entangled in all sorts
of petty prejudices and demagogical utterances; for instance,
Samoa, the tonnage dues, the sugar-bounty question, the most-*
favored-nation clause, etc., etc., which keep the two countries
constantly at loggerheads,
-^o you not see that submission of
such questions to such a tribunal as is now proposed, so far
from being derogatory to sovereignty, really relieves the
sovereign and the ii'oreign office of the most vexatious fetters
and limitations of parliamentarianisra.
"
la.Holls, p. 267
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VIII.
IN'i'ERVEI^TIOW II{ VENEZUELA.
^
1. Germany and the Monroe -doctrine.
Eight years after he was retired, -^ismarclc, privileged at
last to say what he thought, asserted that the Monroe Doctrine
was "a species of arrogance peculiarly American and inexcusable.","^
And many of his countrymen, when they came to think of it at all,
held the same view. While ^^erraan ambitions were confined to Europe,
the cornerstone of American foreign policy was of only academic
interest. ±Jut with the coming of imperial ambitions German thinkers
were much concerned with the doctrine. On examination it appeared
to them that the Monroe i^octrine was as much a self-denying ordi-
nance on the part of the United ^tates as a prohibition addressed
to Ji-urope; and that when America became interested abroad, in oam-
oa and in the ir'hilippines , it could not longer expect Ji<urope to
stay out of America. J-'heu it was asserted that the doctrine was
justified only when American sovereignty was endangered, and was
2
not accepted, but only tolerated, in Europe.
aoon the Monroe J-'octrine became a vital question, '^or Ger-
mans conceived foreign commerce to be a bone over which nations
fought; it was impossible to share it, but the stronger one would
take all. And in this light the doctrine appeared an unjust hand-
icap imposed to enable the united States to monopolize -^outh and
1. von iichierbrand in Uentnry 42:155, May, 1902.
2. Dr. Zraus in -Uie Monroedoktrin (pp. 360-1 J expressed this view
as late as 1913. ^'omment in I'ower: Essays, pp.34-
5
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Central -American trade by denying to European pov/ere any sphere
8
of influence or trade centers, -"-nd yet to support ^eririan indus-
try manufactures must be sold on foreign markets.
German imperial aims have in recent years received sufficient
airing. It is common knowledge that ''ermany felt a burning- need
for a pQrt in the West indies or Venezuela. One ill-informed
imperialist suggested 1898 as a good time to purchase the Danish
West Indies, because the united i:)tates needed German sympathy
and would not have enough money to maize the purchase themselves.
It took more than words to break bones, however, and such cGoHy
calculating articles were considered as merely the opinion of some
n «/ J.
more German professors. Ideas could do no damage.
J3ut Mien German diplomacy began to put ideas into action
the case was different, -"-he r'oreign Office commenced to shov; a
willingness to fish in troubled waters: Americans believed that
Germany was preventing the sale of the Danish "'est Indies to the
United states, and had eyes upon them herself; in 1897 America
was rather shocked at the haste with which Germany sent gunboats
to Port-au-Prince in Haiti to protect a i:^erman subject; it was
reported that jbismarek had endeavored to acquirea Cuba, -out these
petty rumors were as nothing in comparison with the announcement
3. Arnold (Vigilans sed Aequusj reviews a number of the most
alarming of these writ ngs in the ^Spectator for 1903 -
see for example 90:369; also his book "German Ambitions". See
also *3mith: Militarism and iStatescraft , p. 240.
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made by the ^erinan Ambassador on -^coernber 11, 1901, to the effect
that in the collection of war debts and indemnities owed by the
Venezuelan 'government to German citizens it might be necessary to
proclaim a blockade of the principal ports, and even to resort to
4
temporary occupation or the levying of duties. Mr. Hay replied
that the President was confident that no pernanent occupation would
be attempted by the G-erman forces.
2. The -Dlockade of Venezuela.
The (xerman proposal was not carried into effect until a year
later, when the ^^erman and isritish 'Governments acted in pursuance of
a joint agreement, followed b y Italy. On December 7, 1902, the
British and German Ilinisters at 'Caracas presented identical
ultimatums stating lhat in the event that the Venezuelan (govern-
ment did not make immediate payment of the war debt up to 1900, and
suitable assurance for the payment of more recent debts, each
government would, to its regret, be compelled to take measures for
the satisfaction of the claims of its citizens.
In 1901 ^ermany had contemplated a so-called pacific blockade^
vshich, according to its note of -i^eoember 20 "would touch likewise
the ships of neutral powers, inasmuch as such ships, although a
confiscation of them would not have to be considered, would have
to be turned away and prohibited until the blockade should be
raised". Ho reply was made, but when in 1902 the "^erman Government
came forward with the same intentions, IJlx. Hay replied that his
4, See iloore: Principles of American Diplomacy, p. 252 et seq.
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government did "not acquiesce in any extension of the doctrine
of pacific "blockade which may adversely affect the rights of
states not parties to the controversy." '-^'he -oritish 'Government
held tliis view, to which the German Government agreed, and the
blockade of Venezuelan ports which followed was admittedly an
act of war, though declarations of war were never made.
The notes served on the Venezuelan Government on Ueceraber
7, 1902, did not specify any time limit, -out vi^hile preparing
its reply the Government very unwisely proceeded to arrest Geruan
and British (-Citizens in Caracas, though after representations by
ISr. Bowen, the united iitates minister, they were released.
un December 9, the Venezuelan Government wrote to Mr, -oowen that it
believed its difficulties with ^reat Britain and Germany could be
-
settled bj arbitration and asked LIr. -t^owen to represent Venezuela.
He telegraphed these facts to ""ashington with a request for the
proper permission. On the same day all Venezuelan war vessels whict
could be found were seized. On i^ecember 12, Mr. iiay cabled to
Berlin and London the information that the Venezuelan Government
proposed to arbitrate, and had named lir. -bowen as its representa-
5
tive. On the 17th -oowen received his full powers.
During the first days of the embro^lio a mob at i^erto
Cabello had stormed a isritish merchant vessel and driven the crew
through the streets. The iiritish and uerman commanders before
the harbor demanded an apology from the city authorities, and on
5, ij'or this and other communications see jj'or.Rel. 1903 under
Venezuela; Germany; Great iiritain.

receiving no reply, proceeded on the 1.5lh to reduce the fortifica-
tions of the harbor, and on the following day they completely de-
molished them. The thorough ..ay in which the -European forces
were carrying out the policy of their governments made a speedy
agreement to arbitrate seem desirable in Washington. On the ILth
LIr. nay again cabled to i-ondon ,Berl in , ard. itome to the effect that
iu.r. i^owen was no?/ fully empov/ered to negotiate. The governments
took the question of arbitration under advisement without com-
mitting themselves, and on the 20th they proclaimed a blockade
of seven Venezuelan ports. The offer to arbitrate did not seem
in the least to check the activities of i^ritain and i^ermany.
On the 25rd -Embassador Tower cabled from iJerlin that it was
suggested that ir'resident xioosevelt act as arbitrator, and in the
event that he declined, then the Hague TribunsQ. would be acceptable.
On the folltwing day the -c'resident was formally invited to arbi-
trate.
From A5r. Thayer's biography of noosevelt it appears that
there was another chapter to the Venezuelan affair, iio evidence
of this phase of the negotiations is to be found in the publishsd
correspondence, and it was unknown even to lit. nay. j^eing brought
to the conclusion that while the motives of the uritish and Italian
Governments were bona fide , the i^erman liovernment was attempting
to turn affairs in Venezuela into a demonstration against the
Monroe Doctrine, and hence did not want a prompt settlement of the
6. State Papers, 1902-3, p. 465, et seq
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of the difficulty, ijor. xxoosevelt informed tl-ie German Aiiibassador
,
Dr. von HQileben, that if this government did not accept arbi-
tration within ten days, the American fleet then assembled under
Admiral Dewey would be ordered to Venezuelan waters. A week
later the ambassador called again, and rose to leave without de-
livering any answer. On l)eing qjiestioned by the -fresident, he as-
serted that the -^mperor could not consider arbitration. Ivir.
Roosevelt is said to have replied: "Very well
,
you may think
it worth while to cable to iierlin that i have changed my mind. I
am sending instructions to Admiral -^ewey to take our fleet to
Venezuela next i^ionday instead of Tuesday." Within thirty- six
hours the ambassador returned to say that his government accepted
7
arbitration. There was considerable delay in securing from
Venezuela the guarantees which were demanded and the blockade
was not raised until -I^'ebruary 14-15-16. -out after -enezuela had
recognized certain principles and claims as agreed without ar-
bitration, the plenipotentiaries proceeded to sign a protocol on
May 7, 1903, v/hich provided for arbitration of the remaining
qiestions by the Jiague tribunal. Later ^r. itoosevelt commented
favorably on the ready willingness of the "^erman liaiser to ar-
bitrate. On this as on other occasions he forced a course of
action on the i^aiser, and then made it appear that the Zaiser had
taken the initiative.
7. Thayer: J-heodore Hoosevelt, p. 2£1 , et seq.
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IThe press brought out a numher of important points where the
diplomatic correspondence is silent. I'he big question involved
was, of course, the attitude of the powers toward the ..lonroe
Doctrine, -"ome papers pointed to the blockade as a demonstration
against the doctrine, while others cited the understanding which
each of the powers had reached with the American Government before
any warlike measures were taken. J-he ^spectator pointed to the
retirement of iiord iSalisbury as "Secretary of "^tate for jj'oreign
Affairs, followed by a visit to -^ngland by the i^iser, during
which he conferred with the cabinet, followed finally by joint
action which might estrange -"a-merican sympathy for -i^ngland, and
8
saw in it a case of ^^erraan treachery. -nor days Venezuelan affairs
commanded headlines in the British press. Sucli queries as "\'/hy
are we tied to Germany?" were frequent, ihere was no doubt as
to the unpopularity of the government's course in acting with Ger-
many, ijord ueorge Hamilton replied for the cabinet to the
general effect that after having broached the proposal at Washing-
ton and becoming committed to intervention, nis .lajesty^s Govern-
ment had been approached from jjerlin with a proposal for Joint ac-
tion, and, in short, could not gracefully decline to act in
conjunction with Germany. Juord Cranborne tried to explain that
u-ermany had not always been particularly friendly, and that the
Government was glad for a chance to bring better feeling by agree-
ing to act Jointly - but this was an unsatisfactory explanation.
8. Spectator 89:986, i>ec. 20, 1902.
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I'he Spectator renmrked that "fortunately America aeems to uridor-
stand that we have been 'hypnotised' by Germany into a foolish
scheme of joint action"^ Kipling's poem on the occasion. The
Rowers, seemed to express -c^ritish feeling.
"In sight of peace - from the i^arrow Seas
' er hal f the wor Id to run -
Vl^ith a cheated crew, to league anew
'//ith the ^oth and the shameless iiunl"
The British and ^erman Governriients had strongly urged that
the President act as arbitrator. Possibly this was because it
was thought that his award would be more certain to be executed
than that from the Hague. it was said in America that the chief
argument against arbitration by .jr. Hoosevelt v/as that Germany
wanted it. i-iir. Hoosevelt, however, took this opportunity at once
to escape what would doubtless have been a thamcless tasli, and
perhaps have led to bitterness, since the award would probably
have been far less than the powers asked,
-^nd at the same ti-e
he gave this important case to the tribunal at The -O-ague , thus
making another precedent for referring disputes to that court.
Beside, the fact that American citizens had claims against Vene-
zuela would have made it unwise for the -fresident to act as judge.
3. Results of the Venezuela -t^mbroglio.
The obvious result of intervention in Venezuela was a final
settlement of the claims of citizens of several nations against
the "^outh American republic.
^nt there were other, and ...ore significant results. One was
9. London -Limes, J^'eb. 9, 1903.
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the widespread appreciation of the capable statesmanship which
President i^oosevelt had e:diit)Lted in the difficult controversy.
Again American diplomacy had accomplished big things, and Jiurope
was deeply impressed. Moreover, the ^^onroe -^ootrine had been on
trial, and was now more strongly established than ever, if,
as was generally said, vxerLimny had been tryirg to shatter the
great or dinance , the attempt had only worked to her disadvantage.
For in backing down after the -t^resident
' s threat it had tacitly
admitted America's right to interfere.
^ioreover, strange as it seems, Anglo--American relations
were strengthened. The spontaneous resentlment with which the
English received the news that imgland and Germany were acting
in concert showed beyond a doubt how higlxLy they valued the re-
gard of -^erica. Jietter, they said, let the debts go impaid
than to take the chance of offending the Government of the United
States. i'i'hile pointing out that the conduct of affairs by the
greatest naval and the greatest military powers was certainly
not impressing the world at large at all favorably, the iJ-nglish
could not say enough for the attitude of the government at Washing-
ton. The Kaiser would never have dared to provoke a misunder-
standing in America with the iiritish fleet at his back. But even
after he had secured liritish cooperation, the censure all fell upon
Germany. Clearly, (German diplomacy was mais:ing matters worse in
the United States. Samoa, the Pauncefote affair, i^Ianila tjay, and
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finally Venezuela recalled incidents where Uennany had come off
second best, while -^ngland took tlie palm. Otviously, the ^^erman
Government must improve matters.
i!.arly in '^anuary, 1903 it was announced in the press that his
excellency the German Ambassador, dt. von Holleben, had been
compelled to return to Germany on account of ill health, iiut the
reported illness brought only expression of amusement. it was
known that the ambassador had gone for good, and so suddenly that
he had even omitted to call upon the ^'resident to say his farewell,
iiis imperial master had set hira the difficult task of improving
Gerraan-'^merican relations, and he had repeatedly failed. The
hopelessness of his task could not be pleaded as an excuse in
Berlin, m the choice of i3aron Speck von Sternburg as the new
ambassador the Kaiser made a much more judicious selection. In
the following years Sternburg had a happy influence upon German-
American relations.
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IX.
THE LAST DECADE.
1
1. The iSecond Hague "Conference.
In addition to the ever-recurring questions arising over
American meat and the tariff - which were as vital in the days of
ur. uerard as in those of i>r . "hite - the years following the
Venezuela embroglio are marked hy several events which had an
important hearing on the relations between the united otates and
Germany. One of these was the Second Peace conference at The
Hague in 1907.
The American delegation, as well as those from a number of
other nations, went to the Second Conference with the confident ex
pectation that a measure for the compulsory arbitration of inter-
national disputes with such exceptions as questions of national
honor would be adopted. And it was a hopeful sign that ^xermany,
the source of the opposition in 1699, had in the meantime nego-
tiated arbitration treaties, and came to the conference pledged
to support the measure, jr^aron _..arschall von jjieberstein , the
German first delegate, early in the proceedings ,delivered a
2
speech favoring compulsory arbitration. V/hile he expressed
reservation on certain points, he professed a willingness on the
part of the delegation to enter the discussion without bias.
uut the satisfaction thus aroused was short lived. JJ'or it
developed that while the German delegation professed their
1. i'or an interesting account showing how sensitive the German
Government came to be on the matter of international peace,
see Hoosevelt to Trevelyan in Scribner's 67 : 268-9 ,^ar .10£0.
2. Scott; I'he Hague Peace i^onference I p. 127.
-129-

attachment to the principle of compulaory arbitration in the ab-
stract, they were not in favor of an international treaty on the
subject, tiermany wou'd enter into arbitration treaties with
certain powers; but a general act to which all civilized nations
were signatory was quite another thing. ViHien the question carae
up for discussion. Dr. Kriege of the Uerman delegation spoke in
a way that made it evident that his government was opposed to
any step which would make arbitration obligatory. Dr. James nrov/n
Seott tells how '-'r. i^rago
,
after hearing this speech, wrote on a
slip of paper, "This is the death of arbitration." Ivlr. Cho ate
,
the chief of the American delegation, paid his respects to i^aron
Marschall's attitude in the caustic remark that "Indeed, while the
Baron admires obligatory arbitration without reserve in the ab-
stract form, he does not want it on earth, but prefers it in
Heaven, ne even dreams about arbitration, but immediately after
4
waking up he turns toward the wall in order not to see it." As
a result of this opposition, the Conference contented itself with
merely a high-sounding resolution commending the principle of
compulsory arbitration of international disputes.
It is interesting also to note that Choate introduced
for the American delegation the old principle of the immunity
of private property from capture at sea. The favor with which
this measure had come to be regarded was shown by the vote of
twenty-five to eleven, mt since the minority included lireat
3. Scott: The -aague Peace i-;onference I p. lEB.
4. i^oster : i'iplomatic xiiemoirs II, p. 228.
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Britain, Russia, JJTarioe, and Japan, the project to add this new
provision to international lav/ was a failure.
Dr. David <J . ilill , who was the •'^'merican i^/iinister to I'he iiague
,
and also a delegate to the oecond (-Conference was trajisferred to
the iilmbassy at uerlin immediately thereafter. Hill writes
that he thoroughly understood the policy which the government had
set for his conduct at Berlin - he was to urge in and out of
season the proposal of compulsory arbitration, carrying the cam-
paign from The Hague to the very center of opposition. The
German and American ^Governments had negotiated a treaty providing
for compulsory arbitration in certain cases in 1904, but after
the memorable fight between x'resident Roosevelt and the Senate
the treaties were all scrapped. i<ow Dr. niil proposed to use
his utmost endeavor to negotiate another treaty. Jie tells of the
reception he met. "In the Jj'oreign Office the termperature was
chilly when the arbitration treaty was discussed. The bankers
of Frankfort had been in communication, and cut of dusty drawers
had been recovered musty papers, yellow with age, old secui'ities,
probably bought for a song by speculators, but represented by
their owners as valid debts owed by some of the American States,
une lot in particular was made specially impressive. A venal
legislature nad passed a bill making a state liable for the pay-
ment of an issue of bonds by a iiouthern railroad, ihe next
legislature
,
placed in power by the indignation of the taxpayers,
had declared the indorsement by the State to be illegal. As the
railroad was bankrupt, the bonds were found to be worthless.
''Unless the government of the united States was ready to
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assume responsibility for these 'sacied obligations' an arbitra-
tion treaty, it was held, would be regarded as valueless in Ger-
many. The FranJcfort bankers would o.nderan such a treaty if tuey
5
did not receive full payment."
It takes two to make a treaty, and in Germany, vfaere tlie
victories of war were so greatly magnified, the idea of com-
pulsory arbitration had never taken firm root, m i^ismarck's time
and later, particular disputes had been arbitrated, uut a treaty
which made arbitration not discretionary, but obligatory, was
certainly not in line with public policy.
2. America, Germany, and (Vorld Peace.
A more favorable report may be made on the iiaiser's attitude
toward peace in the Russo-Japanese war. Something was known at the
time of the vigorous diplomacy by which ir'resident rioosevelt fin-
ally induced the two nations to appoint plenipotentiaries to dis-
cuss terms and negotiate a peace, and by which he urged upon
Japan the v/isdom of moderation and at the same time tried to
make the Tsar appreciate the hopelessness of the Kussian position.
iVhen a treaty was finally signed it was universally recognized as
a tribute to the skill and energy of the jr'resident of the united
States, un the authority of a portion of the Willy-lUcky cor-
respondence, it has been asserted that the ^.aiser, in order that
both Japan and Russia might be crippled in the war, was urging
the Tsar to fight on at the very time that President i^oosevelt
was advising peace.
6
5. Hill: My Impressions of the ^iser, p. 102.
6. Bernstein: 'I'llly-xJicky uor respondence
, pp. 62, 66-7. Dr. David
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Whatever the motives of the ueruian -^inperor , it appears from
a careful reading of the IVilly-l^iclcy <-!orresporidence , reinforced by
ivir. itoosevelt ' s aorrespondence on the subject of the Portsmouth
Peace recently published in Soribner's Magazine, that the Zaiser
did, after he was approached by the -^resident, use his good of-
7
fices to induce the Tsar to consent to Japanese terms. The
Kaiser's notorious apprehension of the "Yellow Peril" doubtless
made him anxious to see hostilities cease before japan could
claim Vladivostok, just as at the beginning of the war he had been
voluble in encouraging the Tsar to use his utmost endeavor to
defeat Japan.
Still another interesting episode in the relations of
President i^oosevelt and the Kaiser is the Algeciras conference.
It will be remembered that the jj'rench Government i acting in
pursuance to an African agreement with -c^ngland , in which t^ermany
had not been consulted; had in 1905 demanded of the Sultan of
Liorocco a thorough program of reform which would considerably limit
that potentate's sovereign power. As a counter-demonstration
J. Hill was evidently only partially informed when he spoke
of the i^aiser as "missing every chance to be a peacemaker"
and went on to imply that he continually urged the Tsar to
hold o^^t against Japan (Impressicns of the Kaiser, pp. 59-60j.
In this case the Kaiser saw that his own interests for once
demanded peace, and advised the Tsar in this sense.
7. Willy-iJicky uorrespondence (pp. 103, 122 et se.^. , 128) indicate
this, while other telegrams of similar import appear to have
been omitted, i^o other view could be Entertained after read-
ing jKOOsevelt-Peacemaker , in ^^cribner's 66:257-75, Sept. 1919.
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the Kaiser made a spectacular trip to rangier, where he landed and
made a speech which encouraged the sultan to resist the j?'rerich
demands, and asserted tlie determination of Germany to play a lead-
ing role in .viorocco. The ijrench Government held its position,
while the uerman Government hecarae more insistent in its tone, rhe
situation seemed to point toward war.
At this point ^»^r. -^oosevelt wrote personally to the Kaiser,
condoning the G-erman threats of war, and suggesting an internation-
8
al conference as a solution of the difficulty. The x-rench natur-
ally had misgivings as to the outcome of a conference, and hesita-
ted to commit their interests in Morocco to the tender mercies of
9
European diplomats. it was, then, through the efforts of ijr.
Roosevelt that the powers came to agree to a conference, it was
not suspected at the time what a strong hand the ^resident had
taken. '"^
American aims in ..lorooco were strikingly similar to those
in ohina - the open door and equal opportunity to all nations. And
American diplomacy - Koosevelt's diplomacy of soft speech and a
8. Thayer: Theodore J^voosevelt, p. 228. Moreton j^rev/en, m.P.
(Spectator, June 12,19, 1920; states that he does not agree
with ^sx, Thayer, but affirms that it was the Kaiser who re-
quested that American representatives he sent to the confer-
ence. The iipectator points out that there is no need for
disagreement; that the -fresident urged that a conference he
called, and may at a later time have been persuaded by the
Kaiser to send American diplomats to attend it. ivir. Thayer
had the -"oosevelt correspondence when he wrote the biography.
Tardieu, in La Conference d'Algesiras 2nd ed. p. 65, says of
^ar. Roosevelt "c'est lui qui avait le plus vivement insiste
pour que la JJ'rance accept^t la conference."
9. jj'or ^'rench reservations upon their acceptance of the "invita-
tion" of tiie ;DUltan of ..iorocco, see j?'or . nel. 1905,pp. 668,9,70.
10. Acknowledgement of the influence of the ^'resident made in tele-
gram from -i^erlin. For. Rel. 1906, p. 669.
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big stick - followed the same taotics as in the negotiation of
the Portsmouth Treaty. -L'lie sending of American representatives
to a conference of ±iUropean powers was a nev/ departure which many
Americans did not approve. number of senators, for whom
x«ir. i^acon was spokesman, protested stgainst the proposal, and
the instructions which ^^ir. -^^oot sent to Ambassador nenry •I'hite anc
Minister (iummere seemed to anticipate for them an unassuSllng
course of action. An open door policy, impartial benevolence
toward Morocco, unbiased friendship for all the pov/ers con-
cerned, and complete dissociation from all motives which might
tend to thv/art a perfect agreement were the principles which
.>ir. -Koot laid down. ..ir. './Vhite was also urged to use his in-
fluence to mitigate the intolerant restrictions which the
Shereefian Government imposed upon jev/s."'""^ I'he American
representatives were apparently destined to take only a casual
interest in the negotiations.
i5ut this was far from the case, ^or the cable between
Washington and ii-lgeciras was kept busy throughout the confer-
ence. Just as he had forcefully persuaded Kussia and japan in
the Portsmouth v^onference , so Mr. xioosevelt proceeded to act
as mediator in Morocco, "hen the -c'rench took a moderate posi-
tion offering a sane and equitable solution to the deplorable
conditions in iiorocco, the ij-erman Government, with its Austrian
ally, refused to acquiesce. "The Kaiser had weekly pipe dreams"
11, Bor. Kel. 1905, pp. 678-83.
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(as Mr. •'•^oosevelt wrote about this time) and pictured his govern-
ment playing a muoh more important part in Lloroooo, When tlie
Araerioan delegates at Algeciras stood firm on their instructions,
1£
the Kaiser appealed to the ''resident for support. But the
President did not budge. Instead, he pursued a course so daring
that a mistake would have been a calamity. x''or '•'r. xtoosevelt pro-
ceeded to call upon the ilaiser to recede from his demands, and
was finally successful. Like the -i-'reaty of i'ortsmouth, the General
Act at Algeciras was a tribute to the firm and upright policy of
President -t^oosevelt. -^nd in the final signature, lie* White wrote
in the reservation that his government, having no political inter-
ests in Morocco, incurred no responsibility for the enactment of
13
the regulations and declarations of the settlement.
Admiration for the success is mixed with wonder at the au-
dacity with which President rtoosevelt, with Secretaries nay and
Root, carried on American diplomacy, "^he country at large had no
idea of how potent a factor was the -i^resident in the international
events of which they read.
Mr. Roosevelt wrote the following to ivir. Henry White in 1906,
concerning his relations with the Zaiser: "I have always been most
polite with hi:n, and have done my best to avoid our tald-ng any
attitude which could possibly give him legitimate offense, and have
12, For a detailed account of the conference see Tardieu : La
Conference d'Algesiras.
15. State Papers, 1905-6, pp. 1000-1
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endeavored to show him that was sincerely friendly to him and to
Germany. :,ioreover , where have forced him to give way i have
been sedulously anxious to build a biidge of gold for him, and to
give him the satisfaction of feeling that his dignity and reputa-
14
tion in the face of the world were safe."
14. Article on iioosevelt and Royalties, ed. by J. ^5. Bishop,
iicribner's 6/:394, Apr. 1920.
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X.
CONCLUiSIOlf - WHY THE "TRADITIOML raiEI)II;iiHIP" WAS SO WJjiAK.
It remains only to consider the scattered fragments to see
why the German-American friendship was so unsubstantial a structure
For although the Kaiser once cabled to -t-'resident -t^oosevelt: "The
fl-iendship of uerraany and the United i^tates, of v/hich Jj^ederick
the ^eat laid the first foundation, rests on an unshakable granite
foundation," it is evident that only trivial difficulties sufficed
to strain relations.
The reasons why the friendship was so prefunctory and empty
are, first, the failure of the two nations to understand one anoth-
er, and back of that their utter irreconcilability even if they
1
had understood.
Germany could never understand -c^-merican colonial policy -
or rather the utter absence of a policy. By an inevitable course
of events the original states had been drawn across the Alleghenies
into Louisiana and -Florida, i'exas and California and Oregon, and
finally Cuba and the Philippines. At each succeeding step opinion
was sharply divided; the American People were, on the whole,
unv/illing to extend their borders. Opportunities to expand came,
in general, unsolicited, -t^ut the fact remains that the republic
experienced a rapid territorial growth.
Beginning a century later, when the t^erman -^pire - deliber-
1. Thus -c>ismarck said to ivir. von Schierbrand , of the Associated
Press, in speaking of the Spanish—^i-meri can 'Var: "This war is
indefensible on grounds of international e-_uity - Spoils,
spoils, - all else is pretense." Century 42:155, May 1902.
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ate, calculating - tried to follow as similar policy, conditions
were not so favorable, -^'he story of ^eriuan imperialism is notor-
ious, 'i'he point in this connection is that it was conscious, in
contrast to the unconscious, inevitable expansion of the united
iitates. i'his fact was never appreciated in uermany. According to
European - in particular, German - standards of national conduct,
the American attitude was impossible. We perceive the conditions
of the present in the light of the experiences of the past.
How could Germans, bred on the traditions of iJ'rederick the Great
and -Oismarck, understand the altruism which prompted iicKinley
to take the Philippines? -^hey saw the facts - and interpreted
them on the basis of their ov/n historical experiences. They read
American professions of lofty motives, and again misunderstood;
these generous sentiments could not be sincere, any more than the
words of Frederick II or of the Iron "-"hancellor were sincere.
Beautiful phrases were only the cloak with which the American
Government clothed its naked ugliness. And once accepting this
apparently rational belief, the German was characteristically un-
able to discard the erroneous theory, however untenable.
And as in colonial policy, so in other matters, the Germans
misunderstood. American ideals - in business, politics, education
were totally different from German ideals, - as distinct and mut-
ually unintelligible as two languages with no roots in common.
These differences in essentials v/ere , as was ixemarked,, made
much of by the agrarian press, i^ews of America was literally
"made in Germany", ii'reedom of the press, and the untrammeled
distribution of all manner of facts and opinions, were unknown
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in (Germany. In that country the journals were closely scrutinized,
associated press service was practically non-exist«int , and compar-
atively few papers pretended to maintain correspondents in every
2
corner of the globe. Under such cases it was particularly easy
for the Agrarian party to he sure that only evil reports were
published about America.
Vifhat, in turn, was the reliability of the news from (Germany
printed in America? The i^merican press was ably represented in
Berlin, and should have received accurate reports. And within
limits this was the case. But a correspondent who was sent to
Germany to report the news would become persona non grata and
hence defeat his own purpose by reporting all the news, witness
the case of ^tir. <«olf von ^chierbrand: during the war with ipain
he reported to the Associated rress the actual state of public
feeling - which did not tend to strengthen mutual regards. "I was
approached ti::ie and again, both at the i^oreign office and outside,
with hints, veiled threats, or direct requests to color my reports
so as to -::ive the impression that there was no ill-feeling for
America on the part of the (German people .... ^wo chief government
organs .... went even to the lengths of threatening me with ex-
gpulsion."
E. Prof, I'ife in J-he uermau -i^npire J:setween ^wo 'Wars (p. 363) re-
marlis : the readers of such high-class journals as the
Kdlnische or ij-rankfurter kieitung or the Berliner I'ageblatt are
often uninformed as to the real condition of public affairs and
public feeling in ii'rance, -England, and America. I'he result
has been that each succeeding international crisis has found
the German reading public living in a fool's paradise of
misinformation.. ."
3. In Confessions of a x-oreign correspondent, ««orld's Work 5:3355-7
Apr. 1903.
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In his book. Imperial Germany, ^ount vonBiilow telle the
following inoident; "Once, during the s^oer War, standing in the
lohhy of the Keichstag, j. remonstrated with one of the members on
account of his attacks on Englajid, which did not exactly tend to
make our difficult position any easier, -^he worthy man replied
in a tone of conviction: 'It is ray right and my duty, as a member
of the Reichstag, to express the feelings of the German natioh.
lou, as Minister, will, l hope, take care that my feelings do no
mischief abroad'". -Lhis was characteristic of '^erraan methods - the
attempt to think one thing at home and profess something else
abroad, to act one way through the J-'oreign office while the j^^aiser
5
made voluble protestations in the opposite sense.
A most unfortunate misunderstanding was that so common in
Germany, to the effect that the united imitates was devoid of any
homogeneity, -i-'his led the -^-aiser to rely upon the millions of
American citizens of uerman birth or parentage. s±e really came
to believe that they would be glad to take up arms at his behest,
either to flock to his armies or to revolt against the ii-merican
Government. Occasionally a political party in this country, to
capture the votes of certain elements, would attack the other
party for being too friendly to this or that European nation. iSuch
nonsense was regrettable enough on principle, for America should
4. P. 180,
5. Thus von nach in Germany's Point of view (p. 330) quotes
Bismarck as saying: "i should dearly like to see the ^nited
States of America, which of all foreign countries is the one
which we intuitively like best".

stand united against other nations; but it was particularly
unfortunate v/hen it caused Germany to thimi less of the united
iStates, and hence hold her friendship cheaply bought.
On their part the -American people did tlieir best to feel
kindly toward Germany. But the things in Germany with which they
sympathized were the very things to which the government was op-
posed, -c'or example, when a Liberal member of the Reichstag, l>r.
Lasker, died in this country, the blouse of Representatives passed
a resolution expressing their regret at his death. J^ut owing to
political differences betv/een himself and i)r. masker, isismarck
treated the resolution with contempt, and sent it back without
6
laying it before his government.
While a subservient press in t^ermany made understanding
more difficult by maligning America, so a section of Americans
went to the other extreme by offering to the public inaccurately
fulsome accounts of the t:rerman Governments overlooking the auto-
cratic features with which we have since become so familiar
,
7
and making the ^.aiser appear whiter than snow. now much better
to call a spade a spade, than to mince matters, and try to avoid
the plain truth that America and uermany were irreconcilable
in politics as well as in other matters i It therefore pr evokes
a smile when Hr. Burgess contrasts the "United states of Germaay"
6. White; Autobiography II p. 589.
7 5^or Gonmient on this tendency, especially in texz books to
*
be read in American schools, see Gerard, Face to ii'ace With
Kaiserism, ch. 21.
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with the United otates of -Verica, and arrives at the conclusion
that" the difference between the ''erman system of government and
our own in fundamental principle is thus really reduced to the
8
one point of the difference in the executive tenure." This over-
looks the fact that a constitution is only the skeleton of the
t^overnment, and is trivial in comparison to the spirit by which
the government is animated.
As isiir. Roosevelt found when he visited Germany, there was no
other country on earth where Americans .vere so cordially hated.
The situation was tragically unfortunate, but under exciting
conditions, inevitable, iind after the most impartial considera-
tion it is impossible to avoid the verdict that the utter hollow-
ness to merman—a.merican friendship was due to causes peculiarly
characteristic of the late Imperial German Government.
8. JohnV/. Burgess; I'he German Anperor and the German (government.
Publications of the Germanistic Society of America II, p. 19;
Dr. iiill, in Impressions of the ^aiser, tells of an amusing
incident when *^hancellor von liUlow entertained a number of
guests with a dissertation on the striking similarity between
the history and government of Germany and that of the united
States.
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